Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Public Management and Policy Dissertations
8-2016

Essays in Fiscal Policy and Budgeting
Krishanu Karmakar

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss

Recommended Citation
Karmakar, Krishanu, "Essays in Fiscal Policy and Budgeting." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2016.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/8693609

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Public Management and Policy Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

ESSAYS IN FISCAL POLICY AND BUDGETING

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Academic Faculty
by
Krishanu Karmakar

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy
In the
Department of Public Management and Policy
&
School of Public Policy

Georgia State University
Georgia Institute of Technology
August 2016

Copyright © Krishanu Karmakar 2016

ESSAYS IN FISCAL POLICY AND BUDGETING

Approved by:
Dr. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Chair
Department of Economics
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University

Dr. Yongzheng Liu
School of Finance
Renmin University of China

Dr. Andrew Feltenstein
Department of Economics
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University

Dr. Juan Rogers
School Public Policy
Georgia Institute of Technology

Dr. W. Bartley Hildreth
Department of Public Management and
Policy
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Date Approved: 28th April, 2016

To
Babun and Ma

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation would not have seen the light of the day without the constant
guidance, encouragement, supervision and most of all unfathomable patience of Dr. Jorge
Martinez-Vazquez. He kept his faith in me when I was losing it myself. Mere words
cannot express my gratitude to him.
I consider myself immensely fortunate to have Dr. Yongzheng Liu both as a
friend and as a committee member. His comments and insights have kept me and this
dissertation ever on the right track.
It was my privilege to have Dr. Bartley Hildreth as a member of my committee.
His immense erudition and insightful questions and suggestions during our conversations
have helped me to improve this dissertation on innumerable counts.
I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew Feltenstein and Dr. Juan Rogers for being
on my committee. Each one of them has been unflinchingly generous with their valuable
time and effort in reading through the many drafts and providing me with comments and
suggestions.
A special thank of gratitude will always be reserved for Paul Benson of
International Center for Public Policy. I will never forget his help during some of my
direst hours of need.

iv

The one person without mentioning whom this acknowledgement would remain
incomplete is Dr. Subhashish Samaddar. For last four years he has been a constant source
of courage, guidance and source of relief through verbal jousts and banters.
I have been lucky enough to get friends without whom the last few years would
be unbearable. My most heartfelt thanks goes to Sanchita di, Dipankar da, Ayan and
Shreya for suffering me without a word. I would like to thank Roy P Joseph, Ankit
Ananda and Biswarup Chaudhury for being such great roommates and friends. I want to
also thank Kaushik Ganguly, Dr. Samik and Dr. Protibha Chaudhury, Dr. Tanaya Sinha
and Arnab Mukherjee, Saswata and Enakshi Sinha Roy for being there for me, even from
thousands of miles away.
I would not be pursuing this doctorate without the encouragement and guidance of
Dr. Tapas Sen, Dr. Pinaki and Lekha Chakraborty, and Dr. Anit Mukherjee of National
Institute of Public Finance and Policy (New Delhi), and Dr. Pulin Nayak of Delhi School
of Economics. I would also like to take this occasion to thank Dr. Ranjanendra Narayan
Nag and Dr. Mallinath Mukherjee, without whom I might not have pursued anymore
academic higher studies than a B.Sc. in Economics.
Finally, I would like to just mention my Ma and my wife here. I do not want to
thank them, since thanking them would do nothing but belittle their inhuman sacrifices
over the last few years.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………

iv

LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... ix
SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................x
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................1
Chapter 2: Essay 1 – In Search of Strategic Interaction in Corporate Tax among the
Countries of South East Asia ...........................................................................................3
2.1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................3
2.2. Literature Review .................................................................................................6
2.3. Empirical Specification .......................................................................................11
2.4. Data and Variables ..............................................................................................15
2.5. Results and Discussion ........................................................................................20
2.6. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................33
2.7. References ..........................................................................................................35
Chapter 3: Essay 2 – In Search of a Soft Budget Constraint in Indian State Finances ..... 42
3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................42
3.2. Literature Review ...............................................................................................44
3.3. Issues of Fiscal Discipline in Indian State Finances .............................................49
3.4. Econometric Specification ..................................................................................53
3.4.1. The Model....................................................................................................53
3.4.2. The Weight Matrix .......................................................................................57
3.4.3. Data and Control Variables ..........................................................................59
3.5. Results and Discussion ........................................................................................62
3.6. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................75
3.7. References ..........................................................................................................77
Chapter 4: Essay 3 – Testing the Theory of Budgetary Punctuation Using Indian State
Budget Data...................................................................................................................82
4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................82
4.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses .............................................................85
4.3. Data and Methods ...............................................................................................88
vi

4.4. Results and Discussion ........................................................................................93
4.5. Are There Competing Explanations................................................................... 102
4.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 108
4.8. References ........................................................................................................ 110
Appendix A: Definitions and Source of Variables for Tax Interaction Analysis ....... 117
Appendix B: Q-Normal Plots of Annual Changes in Budget Estimates .................... 118

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Page
Table 2.1: Average, Standard Deviation (SD) and Coefficient of Variation
(CV) of EATR and STR

21

Table 2.2: Reduction in Statutory Tax Rates

23

Table 2.3: Estimations Results for Nash Interaction, Equal Weights

25

Table 2.4: Estimation Results for Stackelberg Leader

28

Table 2.5: Estimation Results for Stackelberg Leader

29

Table 2.6: Year of signing/coming into effect of Double Tax Avoidance
Treaties

33

Table 3.1: State wise Averages of the Variables Used (1987-2007)

63

Table 3.2: Effect of Neighbors’ Gross Fiscal Balance

68

Table 3.3: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories
(Inverse Geographic Distance Weight)

70

Table 3.4: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories
(Inverse GSDP Distance Weight)

71

Table 3.5: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories
(Inverse Poverty Distance Weight)

72

Table 3.6: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories
(Inverse Political Distance Weight)

73

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Normality Results of Budget
Changes in Each State, 2001-2013

98

Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Normality Results of Budget
Changes in Each Expenditure Category, 2001-2013

100

Table 4.3: Fixed Effect Estimation Results

105

Table 4.4: Fixed Effect Estimation Results (Cont.)

106

Table 4.5: Test of Normality Results for the Estimated Residuals

108

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Page
Figure 2.1: Movement of Statutory Tax Rate

23

Figure 2.2: Movement of Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR)

24

Figure 4.1: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates,
combined 2001-2013

93

Figure 4.2: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates
(by State, 2001-2013)

95

Figure 4.3: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates
(by State, 2001-2013)

95

Figure 4.4: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates
(by State, 2001-2013)

96

Figure 4.5: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates
(by Category, 2001-2013)

96

Figure 4.6: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates
(by Category, 2001-2013)

97

Figure 4.7: L-Kurtosis for All Expenditure Categories, All States combined,
2001-2013

100

Figure B.1: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in budget Estimates (By State,
2001-2013)

118

Figure B.2: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in budget Estimates (By State,
2001-2013)

119

Figure B.3: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in budget Estimates (By State,
2001-2013)

120

Figure B.4: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in Budget Estimates (By
Category, 2001-2013)

121

Figure B.5: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in Budget Estimates (By
Category, 2001-2013)

122

ix

SUMMARY

Tax competition literature predicts a world where countries will suppress taxes on
mobile capital to attract it from elsewhere. Do the countries of South East Asia interact
with each other strategically and compete when setting corporate taxes or do they
compete for capital through other incentives? Data was collected from World Bank and
American Enterprise Institute to model the tax interaction across these countries as a
spatially dependent process. Findings indicate that these countries compete in terms of
taxes amongst themselves only to a limited extent, but try to attract capital through nontax incentives. Moreover, the spread of production processes by MNCs in these countries
are such that they can act as a block to attract capital from the rest of the world, while not
competing too much amongst them.
Does Soft Budget Constraint exist in Indian State finances? If it does what is its
extent and how does it manifest itself? Using data from Reserve Bank of India and
Ministry of Finance sources our analysis indicate that states in India do indeed enjoy the
benefits of soft budget constraint and expect the Central government to bail them out
through regular resource transfers.
Can the Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium of policy making explain the pattern of
jumps and stasis in Indian state budgets? Or can explanations like political business cycle
and forecast error correction be sufficient to explain such patterns? A detailed study of
the annual budgetary changes indicate that although such competing explanations can
partly explain the pattern, but still the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory is strongly
applicable in explaining the leptokurtic pattern of annual budgetary changes in India.

x

Chapter 1: Introduction
Strategic interaction across governments – both vertically and horizontally –
creates externalities. Tax competition literature has long predicted a global race to the
bottom in terms of corporate taxes while the literature on soft budget constraint point to
strategic interaction across government as the source of the softening of the budget
constraints. Both of these phenomena can be thought of as negative externalities
originating from the strategic interactions. In this dissertation I have looked at the
empirical evidence of such strategic interaction.
In the first essay, I have searched for strategic interaction corporate tax policy
among the countries of south East Asia. This is part and extension of the scholarship
about corporate tax interaction in EU and OECD countries. My first question was
whether we can find empirical evidence of strategic interaction among the countries of
South East Asia and my second question was whether this interaction, if found, is of
Nash or Stackelberg type. I used spatial dynamic autoregressive panel model for the
analysis. There is evidence of interaction but there is no clear leader in my sample. Of
course China, Japan, and South Korea could well be the leaders if we expand the region,
but those countries are vastly different from my sample. However, there is evidence that
the countries in my sample are competing through non-tax incentives to attract capital.
Finally, an analysis of the trade patterns among these countries indicates one important
pattern. The trade among these countries is in intermediate goods, which means MNCs
are spreading their production process across the region and taking benefit of transfer
pricing mechanisms.
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In my second essay, I have searched for empirical evidence of Soft Budget
Constraint in Indian state budgets. Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) exists when any state
consistently behaves in a fiscally irresponsible way and believes that resource transfer
from the center will bail it out. There have been allegations that SBC exists in Indian
state budgets but yet no empirical attempt to search for its evidence. I looked for evidence
of strategic behavior of states with respect to both Finance Commission and erstwhile
Planning Commission. At the same time I also searched for evidence of states trying to
replicate neighboring states in their incurring of deficits. The idea is that if SBC is there
then State A would think well state B is not being punished for deficits then why should I
be. There is clear evidence of SBC. Moreover it is not stemming from a mimicking
behavior in sector specific expenditures.
Finally the third essay looks at Indian state budget through the lens of Punctuated
Equilibrium Theory (PET). Can this theory be applied to Indian policy making in general
and budgets in particular? The answer that I found is yes it does. The year to year change
in budgeted revenue expenditure is strongly consistent with the leptokurtic pattern
predicted by Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of policy making. Moreover, forecast error
correction and other explanations like political business cycle, although explains part of
the pattern, but still cannot completely substitute PET as the explanation to the year to
year budget changes.

2

Chapter 2: Essay 1 – In Search of Strategic Interaction in Corporate
Tax among the Countries of South East Asia

2.1. Introduction
Over the last couple of decades the pattern of global integration has meant that
both commodities and factors of production (including Foreign Direct Investment or FDI)
have become increasingly more mobile across borders (Hines Jr., 2005; Frankel, 1992,
1993; Obstfeld, 1993). Not only has FDI become more mobile across borders, its
responsiveness to tax policy has also become high. Studies trying to estimate the
responsiveness of FDI to yearly changes in after-tax rates of return generally find that the
elasticity of FDI with respect to after-tax returns is close to unity (Hines Jr., 2005).
Hartman (1984), Boskin & Gale, (1987), Young (1988), Murthy (1989), Grubert and
Mutti (1991), and Hines and Rice (1994) among others have all found that FDI has been
or become quite tax sensitive across the world. Altshuler, Grubert, & Newlon (2002)
estimates that the tax sensitivity of FDI has increased over the period 1984-1992.
According to the estimates of Altshuler and Grubert (2004) this elasticity seems to have
continued to increase over time. Other studies that have found similar effects of taxes on
FDI include Hines (1996), and Gorter and Parikh (2000). Globalization is thus making
government policies across countries interdependent. This interdependence across
countries especially in the context of corporate and income tax and specifically for the
countries of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and
European Union has elicited both theoretical and practical interests. Large bodies of both
theoretical research (see for example Zodrow, 2003 or Wilson, 1999 for surveys) and
empirical research (see for example Griffith and Klemm, 2004, Genschel, 2011, or Adam
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et. al., 2013 for surveys) have developed to study and understand these issues. The
conclusions reached by the theoretical literature are that the tax burden on capital is likely
to be lower in relatively smaller countries, while the burden on the immobile factors such
as labor and land is likely to be higher. It has also been concluded that the constraint on
tax revenue implies that social services loose out vis-a-vis infrastructural spending as
countries tend to compete with each other through the improvement of available public
inputs. The evidences found by the empirical works are however mixed. Some find that
there is a strong indication that corporate tax policies in these countries are strategic
complements of each other, while others do not find any such evidence. Nevertheless, the
prospect of sovereign countries of EU losing control over a traditional source of tax
revenue has caught the attention of the policy makers in Europe, and elsewhere.
There are several ingenious ways to avoid the tax burden of capital and corporate
taxes in a high tax country. In addition to actually shifting physical capital (which is a
time consuming process), multinationals often engage in tax avoidance activities like –
debt financing, profit shifting, and transfer pricing (Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998).
Evidences from an International Monetary Fund (IMF) study (Gropp & Kostial, 2001)
show that Multinational Corporations (MNCs) spend a substantial amount of economic
resources in tax planning (for example employing consultancy companies to determine
transfer pricing) which can reduce their global tax liabilities. By using debt instead of
equity financing multinationals can reduce the tax burden on subsidiaries in countries
with higher corporate tax rates. The amount of debt in the financial structure of the
subsidiary determines the interest payment to the parent unit which is generally
deductible for the purposes of tax calculation in most countries and a high interest
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payment reduces the tax payable. Hines and Hubbard (1990), Grubert (1998), and Desai
et. al. (2004) among others find evidence that American multinationals engage in these
financial restructuring of their affiliates and subsidiaries. The subsidiaries, which are debt
financed (or have high debt levels), are more often located in high tax countries relative
to the subsidiaries which are equity financed. Although these studies use data from US
multinationals, there is no logical reason to suspect that multinationals from other
industrialized countries will behave any differently. All in all these studies support the
conjecture that the flow of foreign capital and the business practices pursued by
Multinational investors are responsive to tax policies of the countries where they are
operating. According to OECD estimates these types of activities result in annual global
losses of anywhere between 4-10 percent of global Corporate Income Tax. The OECD is
attempting to prevent such exploitation of the tax rules through its Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative. Not only within the OECD, the BEP initiative is trying
to engage the developing countries as well.
All these evidences of increasing mobility of capital across border and capital’s
responsiveness to corporate tax rates have given rise to the possibility of countries or subnational jurisdictions within countries (as in the case of some federal countries)
competing with each other in terms of tax rates to attract the footloose capital1. The
creation of regional blocs like Andean Community and MERCOSUR in South America,
ECOWAS in West Africa and ASEAN in South East Asia is shaping and reshaping the
pattern of international trade and movement of capital. Thus the analysis of tax
As an addition weak point, the developing and transition countries also suffer from weak
tax administration leading to inadequacy of tax revenue for the running of the governments.
Therefore, the alleged ills of tax competition are far more severe for developing and
transition countries.

1
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competition and strategic interaction within these blocs has become important issues for
serious consideration. Although the issue of strategic interaction in corporate tax has been
widely studied in the context of EU, there have been fewer studies for other comparable
supra national associations and regions of the world.
In particular, the south-east Asian countries have been destinations of footloose
capital for last two decades. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in these countries has not
only created new tax bases but has also been the engine of rapid growth. The countries in
this region have increasingly become the manufacturing hub of the world. Cheap labor in
conjunction with encouraging industrial policies has drawn both newer technology
industries and traditional industries (for example textile) to this region. However, we do
not know much about the tax interaction among these countries and geopolitical entities 2.
What does the experience of European Union countries in terms of interdependency of
corporate tax setting has to offer to these countries? To bridge this gap the main goal of
this paper is to empirically investigate whether there is evidence of strategic interaction in
corporate taxes among the countries and geopolitical entities of the south east Asian
region.

2.2. Literature Review
Oates (1972)3 first informally discussed the interjurisdictional competition for
capital. It was, however, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) who gave a
formal treatment to interjurisdictional tax competition and its effects. This seminal
In this region we have Hong Kong SAR which is part of China and although is not a
country, but still maintains its own tax rates.
3 Tiebout (1956) also addresses tax competition but in a different vein.
2
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model, which is sometimes referred to as the WZM model, gave rise to a substantial body
of both theoretical and empirical literature on tax competition and its effects. This
‘classical’ literature on tax competition argued that when there is an immobile factor of
production available (which many interpreted as labor) then a source-based tax on the
mobile factor (which was interpreted as capital) is inefficient and results in flight of the
mobile factor (henceforth capital). With the jurisdictions being ‘small’ or price takers, the
capital flight will continue till the after tax return in the domestic economy is equalized
with the net return to capital on foreign economies (Gordon, 1986; Razin and Sadka,
1991). The natural corollary to this line of argument is that the economies being aware of
this possibility will reduce capital tax rates to zero (since all jurisdictions are assumed to
be identical) and a ‘race to the bottom’ would ensue. In a different context even the
optimal tax literature says that zero tax rate on mobile capital is the efficient rate for
small open economies (Diamond and Mirrless, 1971). Moreover, countries with non-zero
taxes on foreign investment are predicted to have lower incomes than other countries.
The simple nature of the logic of the WZM model and the policy initiatives that
started in Europe would lead an unsuspecting observer to believe that the research on tax
competition is unequivocal about the negative effects of tax competition. However, in
reality that has not been the case. Looking closely (Zodrow, 2003) we can see that the
WZM model crucially depends on several standard but simplifying assumptions. These
include the price taking nature of the jurisdictions (countries or subnational regions), a
Nash type single period interaction between jurisdictions, fixed supply of factors in each
jurisdiction, identical tastes and preferences for all residents in each jurisdictions, a single
final commodity, benevolent governments providing a “private” good from the tax
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revenues without any spillover, greenfield type capital investment, and only two policy
instruments – taxes on capital and head taxes on labor. Once these assumptions are
relaxed to make the WZM model more complex the policy conclusions of the expanded
models become more nuanced and less unequivocal.
The empirical literature on the existence of tax competition can be grouped into
‘first generation’ studies and ‘second generation’ studies. The first generation studies
start by taking the mobility of capital as given. They implicitly assumed if a country have
fewer restrictions on capital then a measure of openness can be taken as a proxy of the
mobility of capital. And if it is found that the measure of openness of the economy
(which stands as a proxy for the mobility of capital) negatively affects some measure of
corporate tax rate or revenue then one can conclude that there exists tax competition.
Even within the ‘first generation’ studies we can differentiate between two strands – first
are the older studies (Garrett, 1995; Quinn, 1997; Slemrod, 2003; Kenny and Winner,
2006) that used the ratio of corporate tax revenue to GDP as the dependent variable and
the later studies that started using relatively more sophisticated measures of effective tax
rates (Rodrik, 1997; Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Hays, 2003; Winner 2005; Adam and
Kammas, 2007). Interestingly, the first group of studies that use the ratio of corporate tax
revenue to GDP as the dependent variable fail to find any evidence in favor of tax
competition. The use of this particular dependent variable has been criticized because an
increase in tax revenue may result from expansion of base and better tax administration
even if the rates are reduced to reduce the burden on each unit of capital. The second
group of studies thus used measures of average and marginal tax rates (following the
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work of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar, 1994) and started finding that openness is negatively
related to different measures of effective tax on capital.
Contrary to what many would like us to believe this literature does not always
invariably find that empirical evidence supports the existence of tax competition (even
the ‘openness leading to lower taxes means competition’ type). Several studies using
measures of effective taxes similar to the above studies have found that openness can lead
to higher effective taxes on capital (Dreher, 2006; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Gellany
and McCoy, 2001; Swank and Steinmo, 2002; Huizinga and Nicodeme, 2006).
In effect what these ‘first generation’ studies enquire about is what factors
(including openness) affect the ex-post tax revenue or some measure of it. They do not
directly estimate the reaction of each country’s tax rate (or some indicator of it) to the
changes in neighbor’s tax rates (or some indicator of it). In other words these studies do
not analyze the ‘strategic interaction’ among countries per se.
The ‘second generation’ studies on the other hand try to incorporate this ‘strategic
interaction’ by estimating the effect of neighbor’s (or other countries’) tax rates on the
measure of the tax rate of the home country or jurisdiction (Heyndels and Vuchelen,
1998; Buettner, 2001; Feld and Reulier 2009, Bordignon et al. 2003; Brett and Pinske,
2000 etc.). There are mainly two types of empirical studies that incorporate the strategic
interaction among countries in terms of tax competition. The two types follow closely the
early ‘strategic interaction’ models in the theoretical literature. On the one hand we have
the empirical papers that assume the countries to behave as Nash competitors and
incorporate some measure of weighted tax from the neighboring or competing countries
into the explanatory variables (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008). On the other,
9

we have the studies that take the Stackelberg leader-follower model as the starting point
and incorporate some measure of lagged tax rate of the alleged leader country into the
explanatory variables (see Kempf and Rota-Graziosi, 2010; Liu and Martinez-Vazquez,
2011 for theoretical analyses and Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014, Altshuler and
Goodspeed, 2014, for empirical studies). The empirical studies that try to incorporate
strategic interactions among countries (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Overesch and
Rincke, 2009; Redoano, 2003 and 2007) find that corporate taxes are strategically set by
the economies in their samples. I have not found any empirical study yet to incorporate
the repeated interaction among countries. Given the infancy of the theoretical literature
itself this is not something that should surprise us much.
The current literature focuses mainly on OECD or EU countries (either at national
level across countries, or at subnational and local levels within countries) or on the states
of USA. There are only a few studies for the developing countries and regional country
associations other than OECD or EU (for example Chen, Huang and Regis, 2014, IMF,
2014, and Suzuki, 2013). However, for regional groups like ASEAN the issue of tax
competition and strategic interaction in tax setting is likely equally salient.
In this paper I attempt to test the existence of strategic interaction in setting
corporate taxes among the ASEAN countries and also to explore the possibility that any
of the countries within this regional block behaving like a Stackelberg leader. Although
the above three works have tried to explore the issue of tax interaction among the
countries included in ASEAN (among other countries in their sample), none of them have
attempted to test for the existence of a Stackelberg leader in this region.

10

2.3. Empirical Specification
The empirical strategy of the current literature on tax competition is the estimate a
tax reaction function. The tax reaction function expresses a country's tax measure as a
function of the tax measures of neighboring countries and other country specific control
variables. The standard (Devereux et. al. 2008, Brueckner, 2003, Jacobs et al. 2010, Liu
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014) baseline model is the spatial autoregressive or spatial lag
(Anselin, 1988) model of the form:
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾 ∑𝑗𝑗 ≠𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −1 + 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 …….. (1)

Where zit is the measure of the tax rate in country i in year t, wij are weights that
indicate the relevance of other jurisdictions in the process of interaction, Xit is the matrix
of country characteristic variables (entered with one period lag signified by the subscript
t-1) , and εit is an independently and identically distributed error. This simple spatial
autoregressive model assumes that the characteristics of country j do not directly affect
the tax variable in country i. The own lagged tax measure 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −1 is included in the model

to account for the time persistence of tax policy. The other control variables (included in
the matrix 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −1 ) are explained later. We also include a country fixed effect and a time

trend. Ideally we would also like to include time fixed effects, but as noted in Devereux
et al (2008) that after the inclusion of time dummies in a model of spatial lag the true
impact of the control variables cannot be separately identified.
Taxes enter both the right and left hand sides of the reaction function. This gives
rise to the possibility of endogeneity. There are three ways to address this issue. First, we
can use Maximum Likelihood based estimation (Case et al. 1993; Brueckner and
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Saavedra, 2001) using an inverted equation derived from the original model, which is
computationally much more cumbersome compared to the other two methods. Otherwise,
we can use an estimated instrument in lieu of the weighted sum of taxes and use an
Instrumental Variable based two stage least square (2SLS) estimation. Finally, we can
use all explanatory variables (including the weighted tax rate of neighbor’s) with a one or
two period lag and circumvent the problem of endogeneity all together (Hayashi &
Boadway, 2001). However, the limited application of this method indicates that a
completely temporally lagged model is less accepted as a good way to deal with
endogeneity. Therefore, In this paper we have adopted the 2SLS method using
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators.
We have augmented the model by adding a temporally lagged variable which make
the model a temporally dynamic model along with being spatially dynamic. We estimate
our models using the GMM framework which implies our estimates would not be biased
even if we do not specifically model the spatial error dependence. (See for example Liu
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014).
In addition to the Nash model (equation 1 above) we have also explored the
possibility of one of the countries in the sample behaving like a Stackelberg leader. To
test the existence of a Stackelberg leader we have followed the procedure of Altshuler
and Goodspeed (2014) and have augmented the basic equation (1) as follows,
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾 ′ ∑𝑗𝑗 ≠𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤 ′ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜂𝜂𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −1 + 𝛽𝛽 ′ 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥′ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ……. (2)

Here, 𝑧𝑧𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 −1 is the one period lagged tax rate of the alleged leader country. This

equation uses a weight matrix which excludes the leader country in the computation of
the weighted neighbors’ tax measure (∑𝑗𝑗 ≠𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤 ′ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ).
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As noted earlier, the two model specifications in (1) and (2) introduce two crucial
elements of endogeneity. First the introduction of the temporally lagged own tax rate is
correlated with the state fixed effects in the composite error term (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ). Secondly, the

introduction of the spatially lagged tax rate of the neighbors (which enters our models

contemporaneously) makes the tax policy variable endogenous and to be correlated with
the error term. In the presence of these endogeneity problems we cannot use OLS or fixed
effects estimators. We therefore employ the Blundell and Bond (1998)4 GMM based
dynamic panel data estimator. This estimator takes care of the first endogeneity problem.
To address the endogeneity problem associated with the spatially lagged variable we
follow the spatial econometrics literature and use exogenous instruments (spatially
weighted explanatory variables) 5. The serial correlations in the residuals are evaluated
using the Arellano and Bond (1991) test.
The computation of the weighted average of the neighbor’s tax measures requires
the use of weight matrices. One would like to estimate the weights endogenously along
with the explanatory variable coefficients. But empirically this is not possible due the loss
of degrees of freedom. Therefore the methodological strategy employed by the extant
literature is to assume a particular a priori structure of the weight matrix. This assumption
is an ad hoc condition imposed on the nature of the possible interaction across
jurisdictions. The weights are row standardized so that they sum to one for each
observation (country). Several different types of weights have been used in the literature

This estimator is also known as the system GMM estimator. There is also a slightly older
but estimator based on Arellano and Bond (1991) which is known as the difference GMM.
5 The estimations are done using xtabond2 estimation command developed by Roodman
(2009) for Stata statistical program.
4
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by varying the a priori assumption about the nature of the interaction. These different
weighting schemes include,
• Inverse of the Geographical Distance or Proximity Weights (Altshuler and
Goodspeed, 2007; Hernandez-Murilo, 2003) which derive their inspiration from the
Gravity Models of Trade or Equal Contiguity Weights.
• GDP weights (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008)
• Equal weights (Garretson and Peeters, 2007; Redoano, 2007; Dreher, 2006;
Haufler, Klemm and Schjelderup, 2006)
• Demographic similarity weight (Case et. al. 1993)
• Or a mixture of some more that one schemes above (Liu and Martinez-Vazquez,
2014)
The sample region (South East Asia) is a compact geopolitical region with only a
few countries. We do not expect any one country making much distinction between the
neighboring countries when it comes to the question of interaction, unless some particular
country (or geopolitical entity) functions as a Stackelberg leader. Therefore, except for
the equations where we have explored the possibility of the existence of Stackelberg
leader, we have taken equal weights. However, we have used a second weighting scheme
to check the robustness of my baseline results. This second weighting scheme uses both
geographical and GDP similarity and dissimilarity as factors in the weights (Liu and
Martinez-Vazquez, 2014). The underlying logic is what runs under all spatial analysis –
‘closer’ entities are likely to compete more. These weights are created by multiplying the
inverse of the geographical (air travel distance to capital or main airport) distance
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between with the inverse of the absolute difference in per capita GDP. The baseline
results do not qualitatively change at all with this alternative scheme, and hence in the
estimations for the Stackelberg models we have used only equal uniform weights. The
next section discusses the computation of the dependent variables and the different
explanatory and control variables.

2.4. Data and Variables
The empirical specification used for this paper estimates a tax reaction function
where the dependent variable is a measure of corporate tax rate. The two dependent
variables that we have used in this analysis are the statutory tax rate (STR) and the
effective average tax rate (EATR). Statutory tax rate is expected to affect where the
MNCs declare profits. Through profit shifting and using transfer pricing MNCs declare
profit where the statutory tax rate is the lowest. On the other hand, following Devereux
and Griffith (1998, 2003) we argue that the policy variable that is important for the
location decision for new investment decision is the EATR. Thus competition in terms of
STR can be interpreted as competition over paper profit, while competition in terms of
EATR can be interpreted as competition over location decision of new investment.
In large parts of the existing empirical literature (especially in the earlier literature)
the so called ‘backward looking’ measures of average and marginal taxation on capital
have been used due to lack of better measures 6. However, investors and decision makers
within firms can realistically be expected to consider expected future tax payments
6These

backward looking measures are generally called the Average Effective Tax Rate
(AETR) and Average Marginal Tax Rate (AMTR).
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instead of some historical measure of tax payment (as measured by the backward looking
tax measures AETR and AMTR) when deciding about new investment and location of
new investment. EATR is such a forward looking measure of taxation. To some extent
EATR can capture the various aspects of the tax system better than the simple statutory
tax rate. However, at the same time we also note that for the governments it is the
statutory tax rate on capital that is the most obvious and visible policy variable. The
entire inspiration for the tax competition literature was (and still is) derived from the
alleged interdependent changes in statutory tax rates across countries. Therefore inclusion
of statutory tax rate in the analysis seems only natural.
By definition the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) measures the proportion of
total income taken in tax from a hypothetical investment project. Thus this is defined as
the scaled difference between the project's net present values (NPV) in the absence and in
the presence of a tax. There are two choices for the scaling factor. The first is the net
present value of the pre-tax total income stream, net of depreciation, and the second is the
net present value of the economic rent (the NPV of the project in the absence of tax).
Devereux and Griffith (2003) in their original paper prefer the former measure and here
we have followed their approach. Klemm (2008) has also shown that EATR as defined
by Devereux and Griffith (2003) pertains to a one period perturbation to the capital stock
where the investment is sold in the second period. Klemm (2008) thus derives an
expression of EATR for a permanent perturbation to the capital stock. This is the EATR
measure that we have used as the dependent variable in my analysis and it is computed as
follows. Let, δ denote the rate of depreciation, ρ the real financial return, r and i be the
real and nominal rates of interest respectively, R* the NPV of the project when there is
16

no tax, and R is the NPV when there is tax at the rate z. Moreover, let φ be the rate at
which capital expenditure can be offset against tax which is conditional on the type of
capital employed. When the project is completely debt financed then, using the above
notations we get 7,
𝑅𝑅∗ − 𝑅𝑅
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =
𝑝𝑝⁄(𝑟𝑟 + 𝛿𝛿)

Where,

𝑅𝑅∗ = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑟𝑟)⁄(𝑟𝑟 + 𝛿𝛿)
and, assuming that the financing of the investment is done using retained earning only,
𝑅𝑅 =

(𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿 )(1 + 𝜋𝜋)(1 − 𝑧𝑧)
− 1 + 𝐴𝐴
𝜌𝜌 − 𝜋𝜋 + 𝛿𝛿 (1 + 𝜋𝜋)

where, A is the present discounted value of depreciation allowances multiplied by
the tax rate (z). The calculation of A is contingent upon whether a country’s tax system
allows for straight-line depreciation or declining balance depreciation. In my sample we
have both types of depreciation allowances. For the declining balance method A is
calculated as,
𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧

while, for the straight line method it is,
𝐴𝐴 = 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧

1 + 𝜌𝜌
𝜌𝜌 + 𝜙𝜙

(1 + 𝜌𝜌)
1 1⁄𝜌𝜌
(1 − (
) )
1 + 𝜌𝜌
𝜌𝜌

The other measure of EATR (the EATRR of Devereux and Griffith, 2003) would be 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =
, where the scaling factor is the NPV of the project in the absence of the tax. The EATRR
𝑅𝑅 ∗
remains the same whether we consider a one period or a permanent perturbation to the
capital stock.

7

𝑅𝑅 ∗ −𝑅𝑅
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Derivation of the above compact expressions for R, R* and A involves several
simplifying but commonly made assumptions in the literature. First we ignore any
personal taxes. Second, we assume that the entire project is financed by retained earnings
and is in plant and machinery.
Furthermore, we are making the following assumptions regarding the values of the
parameters in the calculation of EATR. The economic depreciation rate is assumed to be
12.5 percent. In major part of the empirical literature the real rate of interest is generally
assumed to be ten percent. However, we have calculated the applicable value of the real
interest rate from the nominal interest rate and an assumed rate of inflation of 3.5 percent.
The expected rate of economic profit is ten percent. With the above assumptions rate of
financial return becomes equal to the nominal interest rate. The tax rates relevant for the
above studies are collected from the KPMG's Corporate Tax Rate Survey (1993-2006),
from the Corporate Tax Rate Tables from KPMG website and from the American
Enterprise Institute’s International Tax Database. The AEI tax data base also has
information about the value of capital allowance and the applicable method (straight line
vs. declining balance) for the countries. The value of A appropriate for each country for
each year of our sample is calculated using these two pieces of information. The nominal
interest rate data is collected from World Bank’s World Development Indicator Database.
The control variables that we have included in the model follow the wellestablished prior research (Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008; Altshuler and
Goodspeed, 2014 etc.). All of these variables are entered with one period lag. These are
government consumption expenditure as percentage of GDP, proportion of young (less
than 14 years) and proportion of old (older than 65 years) people in the total population
18

as a percentage of working population (dependency ratio), population density, proportion
of urban population and openness of the economy. The countries and geopolitical entities
in our sample differ from each other widely. On the one hand we have resource rich
countries like Indonesia and on the other we have Singapore and Hong Kong which have
hardly any natural resource. According to Rogers (2002) these natural resource poor
countries and entities have thrived due to their governments’ policies of attracting
businesses and capital by providing a preferential treatment for capital. Therefore to
capture the effect of the availability of natural resources on tax interaction we have
included the rent from natural resources earned by these countries as a percentage of their
GDP as a new explanatory variable. The source of data is the World Bank's World
Development Indicator database 8.
ASEAN currently includes ten countries - Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. The South East
Asia region has one more member country – East Timor. Other geo-political entities in
this region are Macao and Hong Kong (two Special Administrative Regions of China)
and Taiwan. Lack of availability of comparable and dependable data has limited our
sample to Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
and Vietnam - for the nineteen year period 1993-2012. The following section discusses
the results and findings of our analysis.

8

Accessed during May, 2014, September 2014 and August 2015.
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2.5. Results and Discussion
Tables 1 and 2 along with Figures 1 and 2 sets out a broad picture of what has
happened to the Statutory Tax Rate (STR) and Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) in
our sample over the better part of last two decades. Table 1 gives the sample average rate,
standard deviation and coefficient of variation for each year. Table 2 shows the average
rate and percentage decline in both STR and EATR for each country separately along
with their sample counterparts.
The average STR has declined more compared to the average EATR in our
sample. This is not surprising given that EATR incorporates the effect of inflation rate
along with the STR and reflects the changes in other policy variables (for example the
allowance rate) and economic factors (lending interest rate or nominal interest rate).
However, these reductions in either STR or EATR have not been without any reversal.
During 2005-2007 STR and during 1999-2002 EATR showed some tendency of increase.
As depicted later in Figure 1, the increasing tendency of STR was mainly driven by a
temporary increase in STR by Philippines and Hong Kong. The increase in EATR, on the
other hand, was due the rise in EATR (resulting from other macroeconomic variables) in
almost all countries in our sample which was most likely the result of the 1997 financial
crisis 9.

To capture the effect of the 1997 South Asian Financial crisis I tried to test for a structural
break during 1998-1999. However, using a simple dummy did not change the results. On the
other hand a fully fledged test required testing for interaction of each explanatory variable
with the time dummy (pre and post crisis) which was not possible due to the sample size.
Moreover, the countries did not increase the statutory rates during or in the immediate
aftermath of the crisis.

9
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Table 2.1: Average, Standard Deviation (SD) and Coefficient of Variation (CV) of
EATR and STR
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Average
STR
31.06
30.69
29.19
29.06
29.06
28.31
28.13
28.00
27.94
27.81
27.69
26.94
26.94
27.31
27.19
26.81
24.75
24.00
23.81
22.94

SD of
STR
6.78
6.98
5.81
5.87
5.87
5.34
5.36
5.24
5.27
5.34
5.20
5.25
5.25
5.75
5.74
6.14
5.07
5.08
5.13
4.48

CV of
STR
21.84
22.76
19.89
20.20
20.20
18.85
19.05
18.70
18.85
19.22
18.79
19.50
19.50
21.05
21.13
22.90
20.49
21.16
21.53
19.51

average
EATR
27.40
27.32
25.33
25.30
25.24
23.95
25.49
25.93
26.42
26.68
26.70
26.10
25.71
25.78
25.96
25.60
24.01
23.22
22.86
22.28

SD of
EATR
6.20
7.06
5.79
5.81
6.16
5.77
5.89
6.32
5.26
5.43
5.34
5.54
6.13
6.38
6.33
6.38
5.39
5.34
5.37
5.12

CV of
EATR
22.62
25.83
22.84
22.98
24.39
24.08
23.13
24.40
19.90
20.37
20.01
21.22
23.84
24.75
24.40
24.92
22.45
23.02
23.48
22.97

In our sample Hong Kong consistently has the lowest rate. Its rates are lower than
that of even Singapore which is the lowest STR country in ASEAN. In this respect Hong
Kong is like the Ireland of this region. Only in recent years have Hong Kong’s EATR
been converging to the Singapore rate. Vietnam had the highest rate (around 40%) in the
region and is one of the three countries (other two being Singapore and Malaysia) which
have reduced their tax rates regularly during our sample period. Although Vietnam had
the highest STR, but its EATR has been much lower (and stayed stable) compared to
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Indonesia which had the highest EATR at the beginning of our sample. Thailand and
Brunei on the other hand kept their STR much more stable and resisted pressures from
falling rates elsewhere (Singapore etc.) in the sample. The reduction in STR by
Singapore, followed by Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam has prompted some authors to
conclude that there is evidence of partial tax competition in terms of STR in this region
(Tohari & Retnawati, 2010, p. 56). Although there is some indication that some of the
countries in our sample are converging towards a similar STR but the movement in
EATR depicts a different story. In terms of EATR movement we do not see any clear
pattern emerging other than slight indication of divergence. As we will see later, the
policy that these countries are currently pursuing to attract capital and to maintain a stable
tax revenue from corporate taxes involve more emphasis on negotiating and signing
bilateral Double Tax Avoidance (both within and outside the region) and creating
regulatory mechanisms for transfer pricing schemes adopted by MNCs. Moreover, the
higher tax rates in larger countries like Indonesia, and much lower rates in Singapore and
Hong Kong follows the prediction of size-asymmetric jurisdictions’ tax interaction
(Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991).
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Table 2.2: Reduction in Statutory Tax Rates
Statutory Tax Rate
Average Rate (%)
% Reduction
28.65
26.67
16.75
5.71
29.65
28.57
28.05
26.47
32.95
14.29
22.50
37.03
29.65
23.33
30.85
37.50
27.38
26.16

Statutory Top Corporate Tax Rate, %
.15
.2
.25
.3
.35
.4

Brunei
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Sample

Effective Average Tax Rate
Average Rate (%)
% Reduction
29.25
25.08
14.18
0.42
29.53
29.80
25.69
12.76
30.34
0.60
20.84
39.00
26.21
12.47
26.84
21.49
25.36
18.70

1995

2000

2005
year
BRN
IDN
PHL
THA

2010
HKG
MYS
SGP
VNM

Figure 2.1: Movement of Statutory Tax Rate
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Figure 2.2: Movement of Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR)

The estimation results are presented in Table 3, 4A and 4B below. The dependent
variable for each model is noted as the column heading for each model – either EATR or
STR. In most of our models only the coefficients on the spatially lagged tax rate and own
lagged tax rates are statistically significant 10. Tables 3 reports results from the
estimations where we assume that there is no Stackelberg leader present in our sample
and tax setting takes place in a Nash game. The coefficient on openness variable is
positive in all the specifications. This contradicts the results of research done using EU
and OECD data. Relatively more open economies generally tend to have lower tax rates,
but in our sample the result seems to be that more open jurisdictions have higher taxes –
Similar results have been found by Suzuki (2013) in an unpublished paper using a slightly
different dataset as well.

10
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both EATR and STR. Jurisdictions with higher proportion of dependent population tend
to have higher expenditure needs, and hence higher tax rates. As expected public
expenditure has a positive coefficient as well. Finally own lagged interest rate is always
large and statistically significant. This was expected as tax policy always shows a
remarkable level of time consistency.

Table 2.3: Estimations Results for Nash Interaction, Equal Weights
Effective Average Tax Rate
Statutory Tax Rate
(1A)
(1B)
(2A)
(2A)
VARIABLES
EATR
EATR
STR
STR
Spatially Lagged Tax Rate
0.409**
0.404*
0.300
0.300
(0.173)
(0.188)
(0.221)
(0.208)
Own Lagged Tax Rate
0.533***
0.534***
0.526***
0.526***
(0.128)
(0.124)
(0.0916)
(0.0777)
Dependency Ratio
0.0699
0.0672
0.0606
0.0606
(0.103)
(0.0869)
(0.0587)
(0.0515)
Population Density
0.0136
0.0197
-0.0191
-0.0191
(0.0633)
(0.0552)
(0.0666)
(0.0306)
Urban Population
0.0646
0.0646
0.0459
0.0459
(0.0883)
(0.0880)
(0.0627)
(0.0632)
Government Expenditure
0.0106
0.0113
0.00169
0.00169
(0.0165)
(0.0212)
(0.0154)
(0.0167)
Openness
0.0100
0.0103
0.00519
0.00519
(0.0151)
(0.0174)
(0.0126)
(0.0121)
Per Capita Real GDP
-0.00750
-0.00700
0.000416
0.000413
(0.0463)
(0.0453)
(0.0266)
(0.0258)
Rent from Natural Resources
0.000386
0.000388
0.000707*** 0.000707***
(0.000263)
(0.000265)
(0.000127)
(0.000127)
Time Trend
Yes
No
Yes
No
Country Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
144
144
144
144
Number of Countries
8
8
8
8
a
b
a
First Stage F Stats
24.23
38.15
60.11
30.90 b
AR(1) (p-value)
0.0205
0.0196
0.0329
0.0482
AR(2) (p-value)
0.187
0.191
0.912
0.912
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a
: DF = (10,8), b: DF = (9,8)
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The estimated coefficient on the Spatial Lag variable is of primary importance here.
For EATR, the estimated coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically
significant. Borrowing the Devereaux, Griffith, and Redoano (2008) interpretation,
(Model 1A, table 3) this result implies that a one percentage point expected increase in
the ‘average’ tax rate of other jurisdictions in the region results in a 0.41 percentage point
increase in EATR of each jurisdiction. This result is robust to the introduction or
omission of a time trend (models 1B and 2B). Thus there is some evidence that the
jurisdictions in our sample respond strategically to each other’s effective tax rate to
attract new investment. However, the coefficient on neighbor’s STR although is positive,
but is not statistically significant. Only if we exclude the variable ‘rent from natural
resources’ from the set of explanatory variables that this coefficient becomes significant.
The (positive) coefficient on the rent from natural resources is statistically significant in
determining the statutory tax rate but is not a significant determining factor for EATR.
This implies that in our sample countries with higher rents from natural resources can
maintain higher tax rates. On the one hand natural resources in those countries tend to
attract capital in spite of higher taxes. On the other, the lost potential revenue from newer
corporate tax bases is not felt due to the cushioning effect of these rents. If we are willing
to model the interaction as a Nash Game then our data gives evidence that effective
average tax rates are “strategic complements” while on an average statutory tax rates are
determined by the historical pattern of own taxes and other conditions of the specific
country in question.
However, the Nash interaction is just an a prioi assumption imposed on the
unknown interaction across jurisdictions. In tables 4A and 4B, we have presented the
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results of the estimations in search of a Stackelberg leader in this region. Here I have
tested the possibility of each jurisdiction acting as the Stackelberg leader. The alleged
leader country’s tax rate is excluded from the calculation of the Spatially Lagged Tax
Variable, and one period temporally lagged tax variable of the leader is included in each
model. This gives us a total of sixteen models (eight jurisdictions and two different tax
measures for each jurisdiction). In most of the models own tax rate (lagged) is still large
and positive. The spatial lag variable is still positive although not always statistically
significant. Thus the tax interaction is still present among the remaining seven countries
in each model.
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Leader Country Considered
VARIABLES
Spatially Lagged Tax Rate
Leader’s Lagged Tax Rate
Own Lagged Tax Rate
Dependency Ratio
Population Density
Urban Population
Government Expenditure
Openness
Per Capita Real GDP
Rent from Natural Resources
Time Trend
Country Fixed Effects
Observations
Number of countries
First Stage F Stats (11,7)
AR(1) (p-value)
AR(2) (p-value)

BRN
(1)
EATR
0.129
(0.202)
0.0664
(0.145)
0.553***
(0.0721)
0.0129
(0.0777)
0.00907
(0.0533)
0.0160
(0.0815)
0.00142
(0.0187)
0.00596
(0.00892)
-0.0917**
(0.0267)
9.11e-05
(0.000807)
Yes
Yes
126
7
92.38
0.0241
0.191

Table 2.4: Estimation Results for Stackelberg Leader
BRN
HKG
HKG
IDN
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
STR
EATR
STR
EATR
0.0367
0.357**
0.0363
(0.368)
(0.119)
(0.201)
0.116
-0.114
0.128
(0.155)
(0.0935)
(0.196)
0.157
0.676***
0.302*
(0.129)
(0.0882)
(0.139)
0.0870
-0.0109
0.0626
(0.0877)
(0.0454)
(0.0562)
-0.166
0.0400
-0.00874
(0.0958)
(0.0651)
(0.132)
0.0155
0.0956**
0.131***
(0.0846)
(0.0326)
(0.0359)
-0.00526
-0.00366
-0.0176
(0.0134)
(0.0156)
(0.0173)
-0.00985
-0.00388
-0.00299
(0.0127)
(0.0162)
(0.0200)
-0.0607
-0.0172
-0.0278
(0.0321)
(0.0443)
(0.0354)
0.00127*
0.000211
0.00111**
(0.000590) (0.000238) (0.000377)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.332**
(0.100)
-0.157***
(0.0367)
0.782***
(0.105)
-0.129
(0.148)
-0.0189
(0.0898)
-0.0858
(0.101)
-0.00764
(0.0103)
-0.00908
(0.0115)
-0.00217
(0.0449)
0.000356
(0.000189)
Yes
Yes

126
126
126
7
7
7
6.869
29.36
23.95
0.160
0.0261
0.0336
0.338
0.198
0.300
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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126
7
39.69
0.0134
0.716

IDN
(6)
STR

MYS
(7)
EATR

MYS
(8)
STR

-0.0171
0.459**
0.231
(0.237)
(0.174)
(0.287)
-0.0692
-0.205
0.00987
(0.0591)
(0.154)
(0.232)
0.429**
0.625***
0.241
(0.133)
(0.139)
(0.144)
-0.0228
0.116
0.190**
(0.122)
(0.0918)
(0.0798)
-0.0708
-0.0845
-0.163
(0.0720)
(0.0722)
(0.103)
-0.0897
0.0339
0.0371
(0.113)
(0.0597)
(0.0851)
0.00452
0.00165
0.00121
(0.0114)
(0.0160)
(0.0152)
-0.00879
0.00329
0.00869
(0.0147)
(0.0122)
(0.0161)
-0.00907
0.00590
-0.0191
(0.0227)
(0.0308)
(0.0257)
0.0011*** 0.00052** 0.0012***
(0.00023) (0.000194) (0.000112)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
126
7
43.22
0.0296
0.989

126
7
5.251
0.0189
0.136

126
7
16.09
0.0766
0.784

Leader Country Considered
VARIABLES
Spatially Lagged Tax Rate
Leader’s Lagged Tax Rate
Own Lagged Tax Rate
Dependency Ratio
Population Density
Urban Population
Government Expenditure
Openness
Per Capita Real GDP
Rent from Natural Resources
Time Trend
Country Fixed Effects
Observations
Number of countries
First Stage F Stats (11,7)
AR(1) (p-value)
AR(2) (p-value)

PHL
(9)
EATR

Table 2.5: Estimation Results for Stackelberg Leader
PHL
SGP
SGP
THA
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
STR
EATR
STR
EATR

0.233
(0.196)
-0.00456
(0.0843)
0.577***
(0.0819)
0.0573
(0.0929)
-0.0248
(0.0595)
0.0571
(0.0578)
0.0279
(0.0154)
0.0317**
(0.0107)
-0.0379
(0.0338)
0.000525
(0.000373)
Yes
Yes
126
7
22.90
0.0389
0.171

-0.112
0.404**
0.499***
(0.350)
(0.158)
(0.135)
0.154**
0.223
0.0989
(0.0618)
(0.184)
(0.156)
0.227*
0.463***
0.118
(0.102)
(0.109)
(0.103)
0.0873
0.0336
0.0369
(0.0815)
(0.0743)
(0.0524)
-0.117
-0.0352
-0.220
(0.0847)
(0.0581)
(0.132)
0.0296
-0.0405
-0.0298
(0.0635)
(0.0581)
(0.0783)
0.0243**
0.0122
-0.00576
(0.00954) (0.00823)
(0.0187)
0.0157
0.00730
-0.00781
(0.0190)
(0.0102)
(0.0184)
-0.0472
0.00537
-0.0215
(0.0286)
(0.0465)
(0.0462)
0.0012** 0.000406 0.0011***
(0.00021) (0.000271) (0.000269)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
126
7
14.37
0.0558
0.0700

VNM
(15)
EATR

0.503**
0.333
0.250
(0.175)
(0.247)
(0.171)
-0.0262
0.00976
(0.0468)
(0.121)
0.475***
0.212*
0.635***
(0.0419)
(0.106)
(0.113)
0.122
0.130
0.0398
(0.107)
(0.0882)
(0.0795)
0.0434
-0.121
0.0397
(0.149)
(0.152)
(0.0623)
0.0420
0.0321
0.0522
(0.107)
(0.0855)
(0.0721)
0.0114
0.00490
0.0194
(0.0189)
(0.0140)
(0.0140)
-0.00551
-0.00430
0.0131
(0.0165)
(0.0190)
(0.0115)
0.0203
-0.0162
0.00670
(0.0371)
(0.0292)
(0.0452)
0.000439 0.00108*** 0.000444
(0.000322) (0.000242) (0.000238)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

126
126
126
7
7
7
12.58
5.325
53.33
0.0182
0.0894
0.0249
0.152
0.700
0.188
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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THA
(14)
STR

126
7
65.04
0.0687
0.879

126
7
102.2
0.0239
0.467

VNM
(16)
STR
0.230
(0.309)
-0.188**
(0.0664)
0.375**
(0.128)
0.0615
(0.0745)
-0.0684
(0.0675)
0.0418
(0.0619)
-0.00191
(0.0155)
0.00328
(0.0119)
0.0149
(0.0195)
0.000836***
(0.000217)
Yes
Yes
126
7
9.029
0.0841
0.846

The estimated coefficient on the ‘leader’s’ rate is statistically significant only in
case of Indonesia, Viet Nam and Philippines. However, the sign of the coefficient is
negative for Indonesia and Viet Nam. The magnitude of the coefficient is small. For other
countries the coefficients do not support any general conclusion. Thus in our sample it
appears that Indonesia and Viet Nam’s tax rate changes elicit opposite reaction from the
other countries in the block. While for Philippines the reaction is in the same direction.
These results imply that there is most likely no Stackelberg leader when it comes to the
issue of setting corporate taxes – either STR or EATR. Given the general pattern of the
movement of STR and EATR in this region (as shown earlier in Figures 1 and 2) this
result does not surprise us. There was no obvious ‘leader’ in the setting of the taxes –
either STR or EATR. Singapore and Hong Kong maintained the lowest rates, but others
hardly followed suit.
Countries in South East Asia vary widely in their level of development, availability
of natural resources, size and national needs. As a result the economic policies in each
country differ from the others in order to deal with country specific needs. On the one
hand we have countries and administrative regions like Singapore and Hong Kong which
do not have many natural resources and therefore use much lower tax rates than the other
countries to attract capital (Rogers, 2002; Chia and Whalley, 1995). On the other, we
have countries with natural resources with relatively higher tax rates compared to others.
Singapore not only has a lower tax rate than others in our sample (except Hong Kong) but
from 1950s it has also used other preferential policies to attract ‘Pioneering Industries’.
For example Singapore offers a ten year tax holiday. The activities of Singapore and
Hong Kong may not have exercised enough pressure on the neighboring countries to

lower their rates, but may have pressured them to follow suit in providing other types of
incentives to attract capital. For example Philippines and Thailand provides eight years of
tax holiday, Vietnam provides five years, while Indonesia provides two years (Suzuki,
2013). At the same time Singapore and Vietnam, two countries which have reduced their
corporate tax rates the most have also implemented or increased their indirect taxes –
VAT and GST. Thus the countries which have lowered their taxes on capital have
(following the prediction of the classic tax competition theory) increased the tax burden
on the less mobile factors. Thus it may be wrong to say that there is no policy
competition or interaction at all across this region because there is not much evidence to
support the conclusion of explicit tax competition.
At the same time we also note that the South East Asian countries attract capital
as a whole. MNCs tend to establish their manufacturing partially in several of these
countries. This is the reason of very high intra-industry trade among these countries
compared to other countries (Kuroda, 2002). The establishment of ASEAN has increased
the trade in finished good with the rest of the world while the trade among these countries
remains predominantly governed by intermediate and semi-finished products (Sharma &
Chua, 2000 and Cortinhas, 2007). Such intra-industry trade indicates strong
agglomeration forces. In the presence of agglomeration forces the countries of South East
Asia which have large domestic markets are not yet faced with the prospect where they
must reduce taxes too drastically in response to each other’s policy to lure capital
(Haufler and Wooton, 1999; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). Rather it is quite plausible
that countries in our sample are not competing among themselves to attract capital either
from the rest of the world or from each other. These countries as a whole are attracting
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capital from the rest of the world. Cheap labor and less stringent regulatory policies in
many of these countries are working as the main capital magnets for the entire region.
Our conjecture that these countries are not too strongly competing amongst
themselves to lure capital away from each other gets further support when we recognize
that in last few years the main policy thrust of these countries have been concluding
Double Tax Avoidance Treaties and bolstering their transfer pricing related regulations.
Double taxation results in capital flight from both countries (where the capital was being
taxed) to a third country. To address double taxation countries can either provide
unilateral relief under its own tax law, or through bilateral tax treaty. Countries in the
South East Asian region have vigorously pursued the bilateral treaty path – both with
countries with in the region and outside the region. By 2006, Singapore, Indonesia and
Vietnam had the most extensive and modern bilateral treaty network in this region
(Farrow & Sunita, 2006). As the following table (Table 5) shows other countries have
also followed suit in recent years.
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Table 2.6: Year of signing/coming into effect of Double Tax Avoidance Treaties
Brunei

Hong
Kong

Indonesia

Malaysia

Philippines

Singapore

Thailand

Vietnam

Brunei
Hong
Kong

2011

Indonesia

2002

2013

Malaysia

2010

2013

Philippines
Singapore

Vietnam

1993

1982

1990

2004

1977

2006

2004

1982

1982

1975

2010

1997

1995

2001

1994

2005

Thail-and
2009

1991

1992

Source: Ministry of Finance websites of the above countries.

2.6. Conclusion
This paper tries to answer two questions about tax interaction in the sample of
jurisdictions we studied. First, is there evidence of strategic tax interaction among these
jurisdictions? Second, if there is evidence of interaction then is there any evidence of the
existence of a Stackelberg leader within such tax interaction?
To answer the first question we estimated the tax reaction function as a Spatially
Lagged Dynamic models assuming a Nash setting. In both our specifications we find that
there is some evidence that the jurisdictions behave in such a way that Effect Average
Tax Rate seems to be strategic complements while Statutory Tax Rate is not. To answer
the second question we estimated the models treating each country as the Stackelberg
leader separately. Interestingly there is not much support of the existence of any
Stackelberg leader in our sample.
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These results have important and interesting policy implications. We have found
that although there is some evidence that the jurisdictions interact strategically in terms of
Effective Average Tax Rate but not in terms of Statutory Tax Rate. Moreover, the
Effective Average Tax Rates have not declined but rather gone up in recent years. Some
of the countries in our sample do provide strong incentives to capital through other
measures like tax holidays and double tax avoidance treaties. In addition, these countries
and regions are strengthening their transfer pricing regulatory mechanisms. At the same
time there is the observed pattern of slowly but gradually declining tax rates most of the
jurisdictions. This reduction in the statutory tax rates appears to be more a result of the
ongoing tax reform policies than tax competition. The competition for capital most
certainly happens in terms of incentives provided to capital in forms other than tax rates.
Having cheap labor (relative to the rest of the world) and enjoying the benefits of
agglomeration rents (as part of members of the region as a whole), most of these
countries are not yet faced with the prospect of capital flight and hence not yet showing
signs of aggressive tax competition. However, in future the possibility of such
competition cannot be ruled out if other regions of the world start luring away the capital
from these countries. More coordination and harmonization might be necessary as and
when such scenarios come to fruition.
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Chapter 3: Essay 2 – In Search of a Soft Budget Constraint in Indian
State Finances

3.1. Introduction
Janos Kornai (1979, 1980, and 1986) introduced the idea of Soft budget constraint
(SBC henceforth) in the context of the public sector enterprises in the centrally planned
economies of that time. According to Kornai, when the organization or enterprise behave
inefficiently and financially irresponsibly due to having the knowledge (or expectation)
that a higher level government or authority (or the creditors) will bail it out in case of
financial trouble resulting from its own financial mismanagement then we can say that
the organization faces a Soft Budget Constraint. The existence of SBC distorts the
incentive structure for subsidiary organizations to manage its finances prudently. The
canonical model of SBC in the literature (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995) argues that the
inability of politicians and policy makers to commit ex ante to a no-bailout policy is the
main reason behind the existence and persistence of SBC. Following Kornai the early
literature looked at the behavior of public sector enterprises and in some cases large
private corporations (and banks) to study the nature and existence of SBC (Maskin,
1999). McKinnon and Nechyba (1997) and then Quian and Roland (1998) first pointed
out that even the fiscal behavior of lower levels of governments in a fiscal federation can
be symptomatic of the existence of SBC. Subsequent literature has come to recognize that
the existence of SBC can create sever problems for the fiscal viability of federations and
more generally of decentralized systems, and in many federations SBC is endemic
(Rodden, Eskelund and Litvack, 2003).
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Wildasin (1997) noted that the sub-national governments (state and local) in
advanced industrialized countries face economic hardship from time to time (for
example, New York in the 1970s, Philadelphia and Pennsylvania in the 1990s, German
Landers). The higher levels of government intervene in such situations and give rise to
the expectations of SBC for other similar lower levels of governments. However, the
extent of SBC in developed countries generally tend to be limited by the severity of the
‘conditions’ of such bail out such as firing and furloughing of employees, forced
spending cuts etc. which can be seen as punishments for the fiscal mismanagement of the
lower governmental units. Developing and transitional countries on the other hand
although have to rescue the lower level units with funds and resources, but they do not
and cannot generally impose such strict punishment on the lower units. This type of
behavior on part of the higher level government makes the budget constraint faced by the
lower level units soft and nonbinding. More generally, the problem of SBC can be
interpreted as another manifestation of the problem of the mismanaged commons
(Rodden, Eskelund and Litvack, 2003). The transfers for bailouts from the central
government are drawn from the common revenue pool while the overspending only
benefits the constituents of the local/regional government getting the bailout. The local
residents are benefiting at the cost of the other residents of the country and this is
operationalized by the fiscally imprudent behavior of the local/regional government.
The questions that have been dogging researchers in this area are generally
threefold. Why and how do SBC exist? How to identify the existence of SBC in a
particular country? How to solve the problem? The relative scarcity of empirical studies
on Soft Budget Constraint reflects the difficulty of measuring this concept. SBC entails
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the "expectations" of regional governments and their “behavior” resulting from that
expectation. Most authors look at fiscal data of regional governments for signs of
persistent mismatch between total regional revenue (including regular central transfers)
and expenditures undertaken by them. There have been relatively few studies which try to
uncover the existence of SBC through analyzing the interaction across sub-national
governments 11. It has long been alleged (see for example McCarten, 2003 for a summary)
that Indian sub-national finances suffer from SBC. In this essay we have attempted to test
the existence of this SBC in the state budgets of Indian Union.

3.2. Literature Review
The creation of a federation is like a many party contract. It is a contract between
the national and sub-national governments. It is also a contract between the citizens and
different levels of governments. In the contract between the national and sub-national
government the behavior and actions of the two governments resemble a sequential game
(Wildasin, 1997; Inman, 2003; Goodspeed, 2002). By studying the first stage actions,
announcements and policies of the central government, the regional government tries to
assess credibility of a no bailout (for mismanaged subnational units) policy. Then the
subnational government decides to spend either within means or overspend. If it
overspends then the central government has to choose either to stick to its policy or to
provide bailout. However, the existence of SBC in practice implies that the credibility of
the no bailout policy suffers from the time inconsistency problem (Goodspeed, 2002).
According to Wildasin (1997) the ultimate decision of providing or not providing bailouts
An unpublished working paper by Petterson-Lindbom and Dahlberg (2003) is a notable
exception.

11
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to local governments depends on the extent of externalities created by the provision (or
no provision) of the local public goods under the jurisdiction of the profligate subnational unit. In his model the central government’s objective is to maximize the welfare
of all the citizens of the country (following the classical literature on public goods
provision and fiscal federalism) through the provision of national public goods and also
by ensuring some provision of local public goods. The local public goods provided by the
local and regional governments not only benefit the local residents but there are some
externalities spilling over to other jurisdictions as well. When a failing local government
decides (or is completely unable) to limit the provision of this public good the residents
of other local jurisdictions also suffer. So the central government has to decide whether to
limit the provision of the national public good and subsidize the provision of the local
public good that has been partially or fully discontinued by the local unit. If the cost to
the citizens of a reduction in the national public good is mitigated by the positive
externalities arising from the restoration of the supply of the local public good in the
jurisdiction of the mismanaged local government, the central government decides to
provide the bailout. Wildasin further asserts that this is more likely to be the case for
larger sub-national units rather than smaller sub-national units. Thus larger sub-national
governments are more likely to operate under the belief that the budget constraint is not a
hard constraint. In effect what Wildasin is arguing is basically a variant of the “too big to
(let it) fail” argument which we have heard for several banks and financial institutions
during the recent recession. Practical experience however does not fully support
Wildasin’s hypothesis. Not only large, but we have seen smaller jurisdictions too get
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bailouts. Examples range from Germany, Argentina, and Colombia to Brazil (Hagen,
2000).
Goodspeed (2002) analyzed the problem of SBC in a political economy game
theoretic model. His model differs from Wildasin’s model in three important ways. First
in the framing of the objective function of the central government, in assuming away any
externality from regional and local public goods, and finally by making the local
governments Stackelberg Leaders 12 in this two periods sequential game. For Goodspeed
the objective of the central government is re-election and citizens’ votes depend on the
supply “public goods” as a whole. Here the citizens have no way to distinguish between
local or central public goods and so their unhappiness results in lower votes for the
national government. In such a model it is shown that when people’s voting behaviors in
favor of the incumbent central government is more responsive to the increases in the
quantity of public goods at low utility levels (i.e. at low starting public goods levels), it is
in the self-interest of the central government to grant bailouts to profligate local
governments (in the second period) so that they do not reduce local public goods. Here
the local government knows that central government’s no bailout policy is time
inconsistent. The central government thus suffers from what has come to be known as the
commitment problem - the central government cannot commit to a hard budget
constraint. The local governments are aware of this problem and this leads to two
consequences. First, the profligate regions borrow more under SBC in the first period
than it would under Hard Budget Constraint as it knows less local public consumption

In this formulation, higher level government does not announce any policy as a first stage
action. Rather it is the local/sub-national governments which first decides whether to spend
prudently or not.
12

46

has to be earmarked for servicing the debt. Second, the local region’s tax burden
increases only by a fraction of the borrowing as the rest is transferred to other parts of the
nation (especially when bailouts are given to only the profligate region while taxes are
raised across the nation). A corollary of this analysis is that regions where the incumbent
government does not enjoy much support to start with will enjoy more bailouts than
regions where they are already strong. But note that Robinson and Torvik (2009),
however, reached theoretical results where bailouts are used by the incumbent
government to “reward” their supporters more relative to the detractors. In their model
the political party which constitutes the incumbent government at the center tries to
consolidate its power and hold over those areas where it is already strong. Moreover,
federal governments in developing countries are generally reluctant to ‘punish’ ordinary
citizens many of whom are poor and depend crucially on the government services, for the
fiscal mismanagement of the state and local governments – sometimes out of goodwill
and ethical principles and sometimes to avert political suicide.

The existence of SBC eventually leads the central governments to fund more of
regional and local expenditures than it intended and it leads the regional and local
governments to overspend. It is however useful to note at the outset that bailouts – large
one time transfers from the center to the local or regional governments are not necessarily
symptomatic of the existence of SBC. Such transfers may actually be for helping out a
sub-national unit in genuine fiscal trouble where it landed due to macroeconomic
conditions in general and for no faults of its own. On the other hand, instead of a onetime
transfer the center may choose to infuse relatively smaller transfers over the entire fiscal
47

year or allow special purpose grants which are much difficult to identify than lump sum
bailouts. SBC is a “belief” on part of the sub-national units. Resource transfers from the
center which stands to fund overspendings of the sub-national units – whether in the form
of lump sum grants or continuous infusion of funds – only strengthens this belief. As
Rodden et al. (2003) correctly recognizes, there does not exist a simple identifier of SBC.
Sometimes SBC is outwardly obvious from the constitutional mandates and court rulings
(as in the case of Germany) and sometimes it is the intangible manifestation of
expectations.
There have been several studies on the determinants of expenditure and deficits in
state finances in India (Chaudhuri and Dasgupta, 2006; Dutta, 1997; Khemani, 2002;
Khemani, 2004, Keefer and Khemani, 2009, Dash and Raja, 2013). These studies
consider economic or political variables as the factors influencing the pattern of
expenditures and deficits. We have argued that SBC is more of a ‘belief’ on part of the
state governments about getting fiscal bailouts. Such beliefs are built up on one’s own
past experience and experience of others. Interestingly none of these studies look for any
pattern of interaction across the states. In this paper we attempt to fill this void, and argue
that the existence of SBC in Indian state finances can only be clearly deciphered if we
account for these strategic interactions across states. The next section explains the nature
of state finances and how these interactions are likely to take place. The following section
builds up the empirical model for investigating the existence of SBC in Indian state
finances.
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3.3. Issues of Fiscal Discipline in Indian State Finances
India is a de facto federal country with a quasi-federal Constitution. Unlike the
USA, the Constitution grants more power to the national government compared to the
states. The consequence of the quasi-federal and quasi-unitary constitution is that most of
the effective taxing powers are concentrated at the central government or Government of
India (GOI) (Bahl, Heredia-Ortiz, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider, 2005a). Having a strong
central government and a quasi-unitary constitution was imperative at the time of
independence. But this has led to a situation where fiscal accountability of state
governments has not been clearly defined. The GOI has constitutional powers to
intervene in state affairs and issue directives to the state governments. Although the states
incur a large share of social and economic expenditures they are constitutionally
handicapped in the matter of tax sources. However, it is also true that the states have not
yet shown enough willingness or ability to broaden the tax bases allocated to them in an
efficient manner (ibid, p.1).
The central government finances more than half of the state's financial
requirements through central transfers or through debt financing. It is true that this
generalization sweeps over tremendous disparity in performances of the States and over
different periods (McCarten, 2003; Khemani, 2004). However, the composition of the
state expenditure (wages, pensions and interest payments) hardly gives the states any
maneuverability (Bahl et. al., 2005a) due to their contractually fixed nature. For the first
four decades after independence India tried a modified planned economy model under the
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exegesis of the extra-constitutional Central Planning Commission 13. The policy tool used
by the Planning Commission was the allocation of funds through the Plan transfers of
which grants and loans had a 30:70 mix 14. At the same time specific transfers were
channelized through the Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) under the line ministries.
GOI used the central funds (allocated through matching and conditional block grants) to
influence the expenditure patterns of the States. For the most part, States were viewed not
as semi-autonomous jurisdictions but rather agencies of the central government for the
implementation of centrally designed development projects some of which encroached
into areas reserved for the states alone by the Constitution. This bred a culture of
overspending and low reliance on own resources by the States. In 1991 the economy of
India was liberalized, the license raj system of central control was more or less abolished.
With this liberalization, the central control over state finances was relaxed, at least on
paper.
As noted earlier the disparity of tax sources between GOI and the state
governments is entrenched in the Constitution of India. The central government enjoys
relatively more buoyant sources of revenue and therefore within the federal system four
channels have been devised to transfer funds from the center to the states15. These are the
Finance Commission Transfers, Planning Commission Transfers (as noted earlier),
Conditional Matching Grants and Loans from the center 16. Due to the political nature of

This has recently been scrapped and substituted by another extra constitutional body
called the Niti Ayog (Policy Commission). However, right now rather than making five year
plans the role of this policy making body is more advisory in nature.
14 This is known as the Gadgil formula.
15 Excellent detailed analysis of the inter-governmental transfer system in India can be found
in Rao and Singh (2001a, 2001b).
16 The Finance Commission (FC) is a statutory/constitutional body convened to determine
some of the center to state transfers. Each FC generally works for two years and submits its
13
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some of these fund transfer channels the state governments may find themselves facing a
soft budget constraint (SBC). McCarten (2003) has a detailed discussion of the
institutional structure of Indian federal system which points towards an environment
where SBC is highly likely to exist. Even Bahl et. al. (2005a) points in the same
direction. Planning Commission grants are subject to negotiations between the individual
states and the Planning Commission (which is an extra-constitutional political body the
members of which are from both the central and state legislatures) on a bipartite platform.
Others have already commented that the outcomes of these negotiations are always
politically determined (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981; Baron and Ferejohn,
1989). It is also found that states run by the same political party (or coalition) as the
central government enjoys bigger Plan transfers compared to others (or can at least
expect to receive such larger grants or loans) 17 while the contrary is generally true for
Finance Commission (FC) transfers which are generally based on formula devised by
each FC. However, the FC transfers formula takes into account the current spending level
of the states to determine and forecast future needs. It has been alleged that as a result of
such emphasis on current spending in the FC formula States strategically overspend in
the budget years just preceding the creation of a new Finance Commission to influence its
own share in Finance Commission Transfers (Gurumurthi, 1996). As noted above,
Planning Commission transfers (which are mixtures of grants and loans) are subject to
political negotiations and this contributes towards softening the budget constraint facing
the states. Bahl et al (2005a) argue that the loan-grant mix of the Planning Commission
report to the central government (GoI). The transfers (FC transfers) for the next five years
(called the Implementation Period for the just dissolved FC) is then determined by the
recommendations of this report. Towards the end of this Implementation Period the next FC
is convened.
17 See for example Khemani (2002, 2003).
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transfers encourages states to incur debt financing of projects (to get the grant part of the
transfer which is 30%). States run by the same party as the center will hold more power
in these negotiations and hence will not be afraid to run up deficits (as noted earlier,
Khemani, 2002 and 2003 have found evidence in this regard). Goodspeed (2002) argues
that regional governments run by the opposition (or other regional parties) will enjoy
more bailouts because the federal/national government wants to gather more support in
regions where it is politically weak (opposition led states).
The existence of SBC should manifest itself not only in but in several related facets
of state finances. It is one of the strategic behaviors of the state governments. Along with
the strategic behavior of states in Planning Commission negotiations and prior to Finance
Commission’s establishment (once every five years), states also consider the behavior
and experience of other states when deciding whether to be in deficit or not. As we noted
earlier, this ‘learning’ from the behavior and experience of other states is a crucial
identifying feature of SBC. However, taken out of the context of strategic behavior this
‘learning’ can also be interpreted as an evidence of yardstick competition or policy
diffusion. That is why it is very important to look at this ‘learning’ across states (as
manifested in interaction across them) jointly with their other strategic behaviors.
Therefore, in this essay I attempt to explore the reaction of the states to the formation of
FCs, the political affinity with the government at the Center and each others’ deficits
when the spatial interaction across states is accounted for. In particular I want to test the
following hypotheses:
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Research Hypothesis 1: The accumulation of deficit by a state is influenced by the
accumulation of deficit of its ‘neighbor’ states. In other words, if a state sees its
‘neighbors’ are accumulating debt then it also feels comfortable in incurring/increasing
its deficits.
Research Hypothesis 2: Since the year preceding the constitution of the Finance
Commission is taken as the base year by the Finance Commission for its calculations,
therefore, the states try to show their bad fiscal conditions by running up relatively more
deficits in these years. The Null Hypothesis is that establishment of Finance Commission
does not elicit any strategic response from the states.
Hypothesis 3: Political affinity between the state and central governments (same
party government at the center and the state) encourages the state to incur higher deficits
(in expectation of Planning Commission and other Grants and Loans).

3.4. Econometric Specification
3.4.1. The Model
Conceptually the issue of SBC can be modeled as a simultaneous equation model
when there is explicit default by the state (or lower level authorities) and bailouts by
higher level governments. One equation describes the behavior of the central government
while the other describes that of the state governments. To identify the parameters we
need instrumental variables which can be included in one of the models and excluded
from the other. In this regard, Petterson-Lindbom and Dahlberg (2003) uses a modified
version of this strategy in their attempt to link the state government's fiscal behavior to its
expectation of being rescued from financial troubles.
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However, explicit default by state governments and bailout by the central
government has not happened till now for any of the states of India (although for substate level authorities like State Electricity Boards, Cooperative Banks and Nationalized
Commercial Banks default and bailouts have taken place). What we can observe in Indian
State Finances is the persistence of deficits in the State Budgets. It is important to note
here SBC arises because the higher level government fails (either intentionally or due to
political compulsions) to stick to a market discipline policy ex post. Therefore our
primary argument is that if one state sees that its neighboring states18 are incurring
deficits without being penalized in any way by the Central Government (without any
reduction in central grants and loans and other transfers) then it also incurs deficits
without much ado. This spatial interaction of the surplus or deficits is the outward
manifestation of SBC in the state fiscal environment in India. The econometric models
that we have used in this paper try to capture this spatial relationship across states.
In particular, the state fiscal behavior is modeled as a spatial autoregressive
equation,
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −1 + 𝜌𝜌 ∑𝑗𝑗 ≠𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + ℎ𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ……. (1)

Where Bit is the observed measure of fiscal behavior (surplus or deficit) of state i in
period t. The own lagged fiscal measures is included in the model to account for the
persistence of fiscal policy. The ∑𝑗𝑗 ≠𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝐵𝐵𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 term is the spatially weighted surplus or

deficit of the ‘neighboring’ states and Xi are a set of state characteristic variables. We
have used both (separately) lagged and contemporaneous values of Bjt to calculate this
term. Finally, fi and ht are individual fixed effect and a time trend, respectively. The
18The

concept of ‘neighbor’ is defined later.
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individual effect captures the unobserved state characteristics that do not vary over time
but affect the fiscal decisions of the state government. We would like to incorporate time
fixed effects to control for variables that might have a common effect on the all the states
in a given year, such as business cycle conditions. However, as noted by Devereux et al.
(2008) in a spatial autoregressive model we cannot estimate the effect of time dummies
separately from the effect of the spatially lagged variable.
The most important aspect of the above model is that it incorporates the weighted
average of neighbor's fiscal behavior as an explanatory variable. Once we have accounted
for the time persistence of fiscal variables (through the inclusion of the 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −1 term) and
the economic characteristics of the jurisdiction that might affect its fiscal policy, the

inclusion of this spatially lagged variable in the model is to account for the effects that
the behavior of the neighboring jurisdictions have on each individual jurisdiction. When
states react to each other’s fiscal behavior regarding deficits or surpluses, then neighbors’
decisions are endogenous and correlated with the error term and we expect to estimate a
nonzero 𝜌𝜌. As noted by Anselin (1988) this endogeneity means OLS yields a biased

estimate of the spatial parameter ρ. In the extant literature using spatial econometrics
there are two approaches for getting consistent estimates of ρ. The first is the Maximum
Likelihood (ML) based approach (Case, Rosen, & Hines, 1993; Besley & Case, 1995;
and Brueckner & Saavedra, 2001). The second is a two stage least squares estimation
using instrumental variables (Devereux et al. 2008; Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 2014). In
this paper I am implementing the second method. As part of a single country (and hence
being economies in the same region), states are bound to be subject to correlated shocks..
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The GMM IV approach gives consistent estimates in the presence of spatial error
dependence (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998).
Even if we observe a high value of 𝜌𝜌 still this may not mean that there is SBC in

the Indian state finances. Rather this state-state interaction might be a result of interaction
of expenditure level – states might be under some form of ‘yardstick competition’ or
policy diffusion to match the spending levels of comparable states (Case et al. 1993). To
test for this possibility we are going to estimate models similar to (1) for the different
major expenditure categories. Expenditure on general administration (including interest
payments), education, and health constitute almost 70 to 80 percent of state government
expenditures. Therefore it makes sense to use the expenditure on education and health as
two such expenditure categories. Moreover, from the expenditure on general
administration I have excluded the interest payment, and taken the rest (which signifies
the general expenditure on administration) as the third category. Finally, from within the
other 20-30 percent of the expenditure the two major categories, namely, expenditure on
rural development and transport and communication are taken to test this competing
hypothesis. Estimated positive values for the spatial lag variables in these models
(expenditure as dependent variable) will tell us that the expenditure decisions on these
items of each state are affected by its neighbors’ decision which ultimately results in an
interaction at the aggregate deficit level (and resulting in higher deficit by mimicking the
neighbors in the aggregate), rather than the interaction being a direct result of deficit
mimicking behavior. This evidence would then support yardstick competition. However,
if we find that there is not enough evidence for expenditure mimicking following the
yardstick competition theory (or for that matter policy diffusion), but there is deficit
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mimicking behavior at the aggregate level and along with that we have strategic behavior
(on part of the states) with respect to Finance Commission and Planning Commission
transfers, then we can interpret that evidence in support of the existence of SBC instead
of yardstick competition.

3.4.2. The Weight Matrix
The cornerstone of our analysis is the idea that the fiscal behavior of any state is
partly affected by the behavior of the neighboring states. We are attempting to capture
this interdependence by incorporating the spatially lagged or spatially weighted measure
of fiscal behavior into the equation. The structure of the weighting matrix is an
assumption imposed on the nature of interaction and the definition of neighborhood.
Therefore to test the robustness of the results to the specific assumption made must be
checked using different weighting schemes. In its cross section form the weight matrix is
an nxn matrix (where n=number of states). Since no state can be its own neighbor hence
the diagonal elements are set to zero. The off-diagonal elements contain the weight given
by state i to the fiscal behavior of state j. The rows are normalized to sum to unity. The
off diagonal elements define who are considered as ‘neighbors’ and who are not. There
are different weighting schemes used in the literature employing spatial econometric
methods. These include equal weights, inverseeconomic distance weights, equal
contiguity weights, and inverse of geographic distance weights (distant states do not
matter as much as closer neighbors).
In my analysis I have implemented four different weighting schemes.
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a. Contiguity Weights: The next weight scheme is the usual and simple contiguity
or shared border weights. In this weight matrix if two states share a border then they are
defined as neighbors and the corresponding element in the weight matrix is set equal to 1.
If two states do not share any border then the corresponding element in the weight matrix
is set to zero. This matrix is created using a visual inspection of a political map of India
as of 2000. The weight matrix is then row normalized. The reason for using a 2001 map
instead of a current map is that in 2001 each of the three states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh
and Uttar Pradesh were bifurcated into two states each. However, I have excluded these
new three states from my sample due to data problems. I am imposing the assumption
that states which have ceased to share borders due to these bifurcations post 2001, still
maintain their ‘neighborliness’.
b. Inverse Economic Distance Weights (Two different Weighting Schemes): It is
however quite likely that although all the other states are considered, but states ‘close’ in
some economic sense to the state whose behavior is under consideration is given higher
weight than others. The next two weight matrices implement this idea. The first of these
are based on per capita gross state domestic product (GSDP) and the second is on the
poverty rate. In each of these weight matrices the off diagonal elements are defined as
1⁄�𝑧𝑧̅𝑖𝑖 − 𝑧𝑧̅𝑗𝑗 �. In this expression z denotes the variable that is being considered. For the

weights based on GSDP, this is the per capita GSDP, while for the poverty rate based
based weight matrix this is the poverty ratio (head count ratio). The bar on top of z
signifies that the value of the variable being considered for calculating the weights is the
sample average. Finally each element of the matrix is divided by the row total to make
the matrix row standardized.
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c. Political Affiliation Weights: All the above four weight matrices are originally
created as cross section matrices and then they are converted into panel format matrices
using the assumption that the pattern of interdependence across states remained the same
across the entire sample period. Moreover, in each of the above matrices either economic
consideration or Geography is given prominence. However, for my last weighting
scheme I have relaxed both of these two assumptions. When a state government decides
about fiscal matters it is quite possible that the elected officials will look at states
governed by their party colleagues or coalition partners for guidance. For constructing
this last weight matrix I have considered the political party or coalition that governed
each state during each of the years in my sample. If two states were governed by the same
party or by two parties belonging to the same political coalition then the corresponding
element in the weight matrix is set to equal to 1. The element remains zero otherwise.
Finally, the elements of the matrix are row standardized.

3.4.3. Data and Control Variables
Our sample period covers the period 1987-200719 and the sample of states consists
of the non-special category states. Currently India has twenty nine states. Three of these
states came into being in 2001 (Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, and Chhattishgarh). Among the
other twenty six states, the states from north eastern India (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam,
Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura) and Himachal Pradesh
are categorized as ‘Special Category’ states. For the purposes of center to state transfer
and grants these states enjoy special benefits and hence are generally excluded from
The global recession started in 2008 and therefore I am skeptical to extend the sample
period beyond 2007. Otherwise, data is available up to 2011-2012.

19
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studies covering the non-special category states. The three new states (Jharkhand,
Uttarakhand, and Chhattishgarh) are excluded from the sample as the data pertaining to
them only starts from 2001. Finally, Jammu and Kashmir which enjoys both
constitutional special status and fiscal special status (included in the ‘Special Category’
state list) is also excluded. For the period 1987-2004, the source of the fiscal data is the
State Finance Accounts (audited) published by the Auditor General's (CAG) office every
year. The fiscal data for 2005-2007 are collected from the Study of State Budgets
published by the Reserve Bank of India.
Most of the elements of the state characteristic matrix are straight forward. Larger
states (with higher population) can be expected to have higher expenditure needs
compared to smaller states due to the sheer size and diversity of the population. For some
expenditure categories although the economies of scale might help the larger states to
spend less in per capita terms, but geographic and demographic spread seem to negate
much of such advantage. As an indicator of the size of the states I include the relative
population or share of the state population in the total population as a control variable.
Richer states have larger revenue bases and hence can be expected to have lower deficits
(or higher surplus) in the aggregate, but not necessarily in per capita terms. However,
other the richer states in India (except Maharashtra) are in the middle sized section, and
as a result we expect them to have lower deficits in per capita terms as well. Per capita
Gross State Domestic Product at constant prices (GSDP) is taken as a measure of the
wealth of the state. Wealthier states are expected to have more tax resources and lower
deficit ratios. States with higher proportion of poor people have higher needs than other
states and may be forced to incur deficits and to account for this factor I include the
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Poverty Rates of the state as a control variable. Heller (2005) has introduced the concept
of Fiscal Space. Jurisdictions with higher Fiscal Space have better maneuverability in
fiscal matters. I operationalize Fiscal Space as the difference between the own tax and
non-tax revenue (including share in central taxes) and compulsory expenditure
obligations of the states (normalized by the former). The compulsory expenditure
obligations of the Indian States are more or less included into the category of Non-Plan
Revenue Expenditures 20. Finally, I include two dummy variables to capture the political
environment of state policy making. The importance of both of these dummy variables
has already been discussed in a previous section. The first dummy variable Dit is one if
the fiscal year is just preceding the constitution of a new Finance Commission, and zero
otherwise. The second dummy variable Pit is equal to one if the same party or coalition
of parties governed both a state and the center, and zero otherwise 21. The state
characteristic variables are all lagged by one period. I have estimated the same models
using contemporaneous values of these variables without the estimated coefficients
changing qualitatively (sign and statistical significance).
The two dummy variables D and P are constructed from information available
publicly about the Finance Commissions and Governments of the different states over the
sample period. The state GDP, population and poverty rate data are collected from

Till last year Indian budgets were broken down into two categories – Plan Expenditure
and Non-Plan Expenditure – both in the Revenue and Capital Account. Plan expenditure is
the part of expenditure (mainly new investment) which is for projects under the current Five
Year Plan. All expenditure for the routine functioning of government and for projects started
in a previous Five Year Plan (whose five year period has already elapsed) are included in
Non-Plan Expenditure.
21 Khemani (2003) uses a stricter criterion for a similar dummy variable in her analysis.
While I have allowed the variable to take value one if the state is governed by a party
belonging to the coalition that governs the center, she only allows strict matching of party
identities.
20
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Central Statistical Office (CSO) website. The population and poverty rates are not
available as annual data. The former is available as decadal data (for the Census Years,
1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 etc.), while the latter is calculated from the Large Sample
Consumer Expenditure Surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey Organization
(NSSO) more or less once every five years. The missing population values are imputed
using an exponential growth rate formula for each state. On the other hand the missing
poverty rates are imputed using an arithmetic decay rate.

3.5. Results and Discussion
In our analysis, Gross Fiscal Balance (Deficit or Surplus) is taken as the indicator
of state fiscal discipline. The Gross Fiscal surplus or deficit is defined as the revenue
receipt plus recovery of loans minus the sum total of revenue expenditure 22, total capital
outlay and state loans to sub-state organizations 23. The other measure of surplus or deficit
that we could use is the overall surplus or deficit defined as the total of the balances on
the revenue and capital accounts. However in government official statistics sources the
gross fiscal balance is presented as the measure of fiscal balance of the different levels of
government. This is also the measure favored, and clearly and consistently defined by the
Budget Documents, the RBI and the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India.
Due to the emphasis put on this particular definition of gross fiscal balance within the
Indian public finance policy circles we think it is proper to use it as the measure of

Revenue Expenditure in India is a government expenditure classification which includes
current expenditure of the government or Government Final Consumption Expenditure
including interest payments.
23 This definition is slightly different from the IMF definition where the loans to sub-state
organizations are not included.
22
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interest. For our sample period (1987-2007) none of the states exhibit gross fiscal surplus.
The deficit to GDP ratio has consistently been above or close to three percent of GDP. In
Table 2, I present the statewise summary (mean) of the variables used (except the
dichotomous or dummy variables).

Table 3.1: Statewise Averages of the Variables Used (1987-2007)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
States
Gross
Fiscal
Poverty
Population GSDP per
Deficit
Space
Ratio
Share
capita
Andhra Pradesh
-0.035
0.270
19.025
0.086
220.698
Bihar
-0.052 -10.287
47.064
0.090
77.925
Gujarat
-0.039
-0.075
20.652
0.056
288.606
Haryana
-0.026
3.431
16.104
0.023
330.645
Karnataka
-0.031
9.344
27.954
0.060
237.058
Kerala
-0.044 -12.511
19.857
0.037
270.704
Maharashtra
-0.031
-3.759
32.046
0.107
325.857
Madhya Pradesh
-0.038
2.513
39.801
0.066
155.012
Odhisha
-0.052 -13.563
48.180
0.042
161.473
Punjab
-0.050 -21.172
9.570
0.027
325.684
Rajasthan
-0.048 -15.138
23.704
0.061
178.028
Tamil Nadu
-0.028
-1.739
28.742
0.072
265.853
Uttar Pradesh
-0.049 -16.775
35.232
0.182
133.277
West Bengal
-0.046 -37.277
31.583
0.090
190.904
Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) is in Per Capita terms, and at 2004-05 constant prices.
Gross Deficit is expressed as a percentage of GSDP (at Current Price)

The estimated models are presented in Tables 2, to 6. The estimates in table 2 are
from six models – two each for each of the weighting schemes (geographic contiguity,
Inverse GSDP, Poverty ratio, and Political Similarity). Each model uses temporally
lagged (one period) values of the control variables including the lagged dependent
variable. The odd numbered models for each weighting scheme use temporally lagged
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values of the spatially lagged (weighted average of the neighbors’ fiscal deficit variable)
variable, while the even numbered ones use contemporaneous values of the same
variable. In all the models, irrespective of weighting scheme or how the spatial lag
variable is included, the temporally lagged dependent variable has a positive and
statistically significant coefficient. We expected this from the beginning. This coefficient
captures the strong time persistence of fiscal behavior. The coefficient on Finance
Commission dummy is negative and statistically significant. The dependent variable is a
deficit/surplus variable. Therefore, a negative coefficient means surplus declines or
deficit increases. We have already noted that within our sample none of the states ever
enjoyed a surplus. Therefore, this coefficient supports the claim of previous authors that
the states incur higher deficit in the years preceding the establishment of a Finance
Commission. As explained earlier this implies that states strategically attempt to show a
poor fiscal condition to draw relatively more from the common pool of resources to be
distributed by the FC. The coefficient of the political affinity with the center variable is
always positive and contradicts our general expectation that states with similar
party/coalition government as the center would be trying to incur more deficit (also
contradicts the evidence found by Khemani (2000, 2003). However, the coefficient is
never statistically significant. Although this coefficient is not statistically significant, but
the sign of the coefficient seem to support the conclusions of Goodspeed (2002) that
central government tries to win support in areas where it is weak, and hence in Planning
Commission type negotiations states governed by opposition (or regional parties) hold
the aces. For the first three types of weighting schemes, namely, contiguity weights,
inverse GDP difference weight, and poverty weights, the coefficient on the spatially
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lagged variable is positive and statistically significant if we enter it with one period lag.
But the statistical significance goes away when we enter it into the model
contemporaneously. For the political affinity weights the variable is never significant,
although the sign remains as expected 24.
The coefficient on the spatial lag variable is the largest when we use the poverty
weights with the inverse GSDP weights and contiguity weights coming second and third.
This is indicative of the importance of the issue of poverty in the Indian political and
economic context relative to average income level or geographic closeness. State policy
makers are most concerned with states with similar poverty levels. Consideration of
overall economic situation (as captured by per capita GSDP) and geographic nearness
comes after that. It seems that state policy makers’ decisions regarding deficit and surplus
are affected most by those states that have a poverty level close to their own state’s
poverty level. They seem to strongly expect the central government to treat states with
similar or close poverty levels similarly. Here, one could be tempted to interpret this
coefficient not as an indicator of strategic interaction across states but rather as an
indicator of ‘similarity’ of finances of states with similar poverty levels. However, the
poverty ranking of states is not exactly mirrored by the per capita GSDP ranking and
geographic closeness (in fact there are wide variation when we compare the three
rankings). Yet, when we use those weights we still get evidence of slightly weaker but
still quite strong strategic interaction among states. If it was only that the finances of
similarly poor states are similar and there is no strategic interaction across state finances,

The political affinity weight matrix is a very sparse matrix and may not capture the
political neighborliness really well.

24
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then those two weighting systems should not give evidence of any interaction at all, at
least not at the level and strength as our results show.
From these results it appears that states consider the weighted average of
neighbors’ (as defined in the different weighting schemes except for the political affinity
weights) fiscal behavior/condition of past year to decide about their own course of action
regarding gross fiscal balance. However, it does not appear that the behaviors are
contemporaneously jointly decided as if in the states are playing a Nash game with each
other. Thus we tentatively conclude that there is some gross fiscal balance mimicking
going on among the states in our sample, that is, neighbors’ behavior matter. Above we
have argued that this mimicking could not be a result of just some natural or organic
similarity inherent in similar states. However, as we discussed earlier, this ‘aggregate’
level mimicking may be a result of expenditure category specific mimicking or yardstick
competition or even some spillover effect. States might actually be looking at their
neighbor’s (poverty level based or based on geographic or economic similarity)
expenditures across different categories and then trying to follow. A related explanation
may also be found in the idea of policy diffusion. If the general trend is spending more on
(say) education then other states might start doing the same by ‘learning’. Such category
specific similarity in expenditures may ultimately be aggregated into similar levels of
fiscal surplus or deficit. However, at the outset we note one important point. Yardstick
competition to be the alternate explanation to the evidence of strategic interaction in
deficits that we found, we need to find evidence of expenditure mimicking in all if not all
the expenditure categories (like Case et. al. 1993). It is not quite plausible that states
would be affected by yardstick in one or two expenditure categories. On the other hand
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spillover effect to be an acceptable counter explanation we need to find negative effects
in those expenditure categories that actually spills over across border, especially most
strongly while using the geographic contiguity weight. In addition for those expenditure
categories that cannot have any spillover effect across states. Next we test these
alternative possibilities.
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VARIABLES
Spatial Lag (One Lag)

Table 3.2: Effect of Neighbors’ Gross Fiscal Balance
Contiguity Weight
Inverse GSDP Weight
Poverty Weight
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.268***
(3.454)

Spatial Lag (Contemp.)
(own) Lagged Dep. Var
Fiscal Space
Poverty
Population Share
Per Capita Real GSDP
Finance Commission
Dummy
Affinity with Center
Time Trend
Jurisdiction Fixed
Effect
Observations
Number of states
First Stage F-Stats (8,14)
AR(1) (p-value)
AR(2) (p-value)

0.277***
(3.802)

0.603***
(6.066)
8.81e-05
(1.681)
-0.000471
(-0.364)
-0.000625
(-0.285)
-0.00144
(-1.099)
-0.0106***
(-6.073)
0.000697
(0.510)
Yes

0.157
(1.761)
1.248***
(8.968)
-0.000173*
(-1.796)
0.00426***
(3.317)
-0.00402***
(-3.701)
-0.00245**
(-2.598)
-0.0107***
(-4.409)
0.00106
(0.765)
Yes

Yes

280
14
4686
0.0104
0.488

0.307***
(6.458)

0.606***
(6.385)
0.000107**
(2.356)
-0.000227
(-0.151)
0.000123
(0.0507)
-0.00102
(-0.668)
-0.0104***
(-6.447)
0.00112
(0.858)
Yes

0.107
(1.172)
1.163***
(7.350)
-5.64e-05
(-0.516)
0.00324**
(2.620)
-0.00300**
(-2.443)
-0.00221**
(-2.314)
-0.0110***
(-4.646)
0.00111
(0.866)
Yes

Yes

Yes

280
14
4569
0.0264
0.521

280
14
1400
0.00980
0.457

Political Similarity Weight
(7)
(8)
0.0700
(1.343)

0.560***
(6.347)
0.000117**
(2.474)
-0.00109
(-0.828)
-1.04e-05
(-0.00392)
-0.000858
(-0.478)
-0.0103***
(-6.305)
0.00109
(0.820)
Yes

0.131
(1.688)
1.168***
(10.08)
-8.82e-05
(-0.839)
0.00310**
(2.604)
-0.00312**
(-2.578)
-0.00201*
(-2.035)
-0.0110***
(-5.068)
0.00109
(0.830)
yes

0.651***
(8.011)
0.000138**
(2.912)
-0.00153
(-1.234)
-9.07e-05
(-0.0475)
-0.00169
(-1.126)
-0.00961***
(-5.738)
0.00126
(0.888)
Yes

0.0614
(1.022)
1.396***
(9.323)
-0.000215
(-1.704)
0.00478**
(2.628)
-0.00474**
(-2.847)
-0.00292**
(-2.649)
-0.0119***
(-4.878)
0.00145
(0.928)
Yes

Yes

Yes

yes

Yes

Yes

280
14
3375
0.0249
0.561

280
14
1419
0.00915
0.487

280
14
2964
0.0201
0.526

280
14
19570
0.00706
0.640

280
14
839.5
0.0214
0.482

Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In the Indian public accounting system the expenditures of each state are
categorized into Economic Services, Social Services and Administrative Services. Social
Services include expenditure on Health and Education, and Administrative Services
include expenditure on General Government Services and Interest Payments on previous
debts. Together, Health, Education and Administration constitute around 70 to 80 percent
of state government expenditure for each state. After eliminating the interest payments
from the administrative services expenditures, these three categories still cover the lion’s
share of the total state government expenditures. Therefore, to test the interaction in
expenditures these three categories (education, health, and administrative services
excluding interest payments) seem to be the natural three choices. From within Economic
Services, I include two other categories – rural development 25 and transport and
communication (roads, bridges etc.). In total these give me five expenditure categories
which cover around 65 to 80 percent of the total expenditure of the state governments.
Tables 3 through 6 present these estimation results. Each of these four tables shows the
results for each of the four weighting schemes. In table 2 we saw that when the spatially
lagged variable is entered contemporaneously, the coefficient estimates are not
statistically significant. Therefore in the models of tables 3 to 6 we are only estimating
models with the spatial lag variable entering with one period lag. From the perspective of
yardstick competition, if it was present, we should find it most strongly in Health,
Education, Rural Development and Transport. These are the categories where one state
might want to follow the lead of others – especially its neighbors.

Urban development expenditure, inexplicably, is categorized under Social Services and is
not a very large share of state government expenditure.

25

Table 3.3: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories (Inverse Geographic Distance Weight)
Rural Development
Transport &
Education
Health
Administration
Communication
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
Model 9A
Model 9B
Model 9C
Model 9D
Model 9E
Spatial Lag (with one period lag)
Lagged Dependent Variable
Fiscal Space
Poverty
Population Share
Per Capita Real GSDP
Finance Commission Dummy
Affinity with Center
Time Trend
Jurisdiction Fixed Effects
Observations
Number of state1
First Stage F-Statistics (9,14)
AR(1) (p-value)
AR(2) (p-value)

-0.0805
(-1.017)
0.624***
(7.986)
3.77e-06
(0.650)
0.00235***
(5.544)
-0.000228
(-0.437)
-0.000955
(-1.698)
0.000562*
(2.072)
0.000105
(0.443)
Yes

-0.00141
(-0.0195)
0.781***
(12.15)
7.72e-06**
(2.226)
-5.59e-05
(-0.604)
-0.000529**
(-2.395)
-5.32e-05
(-0.359)
-0.000146
(-1.241)
-0.000116
(-1.401)
Yes

0.0357
(0.789)
0.827***
(38.27)
3.51e-06
(0.329)
0.00196
(1.727)
-0.000653
(-0.876)
-0.000720
(-0.863)
0.000462
(1.101)
-0.000284
(-0.629)
Yes

0.0244
(0.385)
0.818***
(24.59)
-1.47e-06
(-0.552)
0.000416
(1.664)
-0.000115
(-0.548)
-2.86e-05
(-0.171)
0.000314***
(3.596)
-0.000236
(-1.591)
Yes

-0.178
(-1.275)
0.748***
(12.02)
-7.50e-05
(-1.675)
0.00250
(1.751)
-0.00306
(-1.443)
-0.000445
(-0.264)
0.000120
(0.127)
-0.000721
(-1.429)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

280
14
13651
0.0841
0.285

280
14
17203
0.0338
0.0723

280
14
2874
0.0550
0.104

280
280
14
14
191
1932
0.0148
0.00355
0.121
0.183
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories (Inverse GSDP Distance Weight)
Rural
Transport &
Education
Health
Administration
Development
Communication
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
Model 10A
Model 10B
Model 10C
Model 10D
Model 10E
Spatial Lag (with one period lag)
Lagged Dependent Variable
Fiscal Space
Poverty
Population Share
Per Capita Real GSDP
Finance Commission Dummy
Affinity with Center
Time Trend
Jurisdiction Fixed Effect
Observations
Number of state1
First Stage F-Statistics (9,14)
AR(1) (p-value)
AR(2) (p-value)

-0.107
(-1.083)
0.638***
(7.737)
3.83e-06
(0.638)
0.00240***
(5.008)
-0.000231
(-0.365)
-0.00101
(-1.718)
0.000546*
(2.054)
9.67e-05
(0.393)
Yes
Yes

0.0591
(1.269)
0.777***
(11.31)
7.49e-06*
(2.065)
1.61e-05
(0.121)
-0.000534**
(-2.219)
-0.000194
(-1.285)
-0.000162
(-1.540)
-0.000111
(-1.425)
Yes
Yes

0.152*
(1.936)
0.807***
(31.96)
8.07e-06
(0.812)
0.00135
(1.290)
-0.000901
(-1.198)
-0.00113
(-1.183)
0.000487
(1.177)
-0.000220
(-0.489)
Yes
Yes

280
280
280
14
14
14
220.4
2030
20346
0.0145
0.00411
0.0906
0.129
0.183
0.305
Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.0952
(1.130)
0.798***
(26.95)
-1.73e-06
(-0.686)
0.000311
(1.102)
-0.000154
(-0.805)
-8.66e-05
(-0.549)
0.000324***
(3.729)
-0.000242
(-1.654)
Yes
Yes

-0.207***
(-3.388)
0.765***
(12.68)
-5.28e-05
(-1.667)
0.00190
(1.288)
-0.00278
(-1.494)
0.000252
(0.162)
-6.59e-05
(-0.0644)
-0.000767
(-1.302)
Yes
Yes

280
14
9831
0.0367
0.0755

280
14
1289
0.0480
0.0881

Table 3.5: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories (Inverse Poverty Distance Weight)
Rural
Transport &
Education
Health
Administration
Development
Communication
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
Model 11A
Model 11B
Model 11C
Model 11D
Model 11E
Spatial Lag (with one period lag)
Lagged Dependent Variable
Fiscal Space
Poverty
Population Share
Per Capita Real GSDP
Finance Commission Dummy
Affinity with Center
Time Trend
Jurisdiction Fixed Effect
Observations
Number of state1
First Stage F-Statistics (9,14)
AR(1) (p-value)
AR(2) (p-value)

-0.145
(-1.182)
0.641***
(7.548)
4.63e-06
(0.654)
0.00236***
(4.716)
-0.000595
(-1.030)
-0.00110**
(-2.224)
0.000574**
(2.148)
0.000137
(0.577)
Yes
Yes

0.0791
(0.764)
0.780***
(11.35)
7.08e-06*
(1.781)
-6.75e-05
(-0.835)
-0.000472*
(-1.812)
-9.77e-05
(-0.765)
-0.000168
(-1.486)
-0.000113
(-1.516)
Yes
Yes

0.0569
(0.733)
0.832***
(37.65)
5.80e-06
(0.603)
0.00170
(1.263)
-0.000344
(-0.346)
-0.000565
(-0.619)
0.000465
(1.105)
-0.000292
(-0.676)
Yes
Yes

280
280
280
14
14
14
281.6
1191
18815
0.0151
0.00396
0.0904
0.113
0.182
0.309
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.0822
(1.377)
0.826***
(26.45)
-1.14e-06
(-0.712)
0.000294
(1.107)
-3.50e-05
(-0.149)
-4.78e-05
(-0.331)
0.000324***
(3.710)
-0.000244
(-1.679)
Yes
Yes

0.0311
(0.152)
0.740***
(9.679)
-4.70e-05
(-1.046)
0.00174
(0.871)
-0.00272
(-1.006)
-0.000974
(-0.571)
0.000391
(0.391)
-0.000732
(-1.443)
Yes
Yes

280
14
44361
0.0355
0.0771

280
14
1297
0.0556
0.0984

Table 3.6: Estimation Results for Different Major Expenditure Categories (Inverse Political Distance Weight)
Rural
Transport &
Education
Health
Administration
Development
Communication
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
Model 12A
Model 12B
Model 12C
Model 12D
Model 12E
Spatial Lag (with one period lag)
Lagged Dependent Variable
Fiscal Space
Poverty
Population Share
Per Capita Real GSDP
Finance Commission Dummy
Affinity with Center
Time Trend
Jurisdiction Fixed Effect
Observations
Number of state
First Stage F-Statistics (9,14)
AR(1) (p-value)
AR(2) (p-value)

-0.0258
(-1.092)
0.625***
(8.092)
5.10e-06
(0.801)
0.00215***
(3.919)
-0.000313
(-0.592)
-0.00101*
(-1.863)
0.000536*
(2.019)
0.000137
(0.600)
Yes
Yes

-0.0275
(-0.741)
0.775***
(11.93)
7.55e-06**
(2.343)
-3.96e-05
(-0.478)
-0.000548**
(-2.336)
-4.17e-05
(-0.371)
-0.000131
(-1.237)
-9.87e-05
(-1.348)
Yes
Yes

0.0201**
(2.197)
0.825***
(37.08)
-1.00e-06
(-0.141)
0.00204*
(2.057)
-0.000585
(-0.779)
-0.000608
(-0.663)
0.000496
(1.229)
-0.000265
(-0.599)
Yes
Yes

280
280
280
14
14
14
226.3
1937
11537
0.0137
0.00407
0.0877
0.106
0.190
0.283
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.0412***
(3.567)
0.819***
(23.05)
-2.97e-06
(-1.606)
0.000392*
(1.972)
-9.77e-05
(-0.484)
-3.37e-05
(-0.200)
0.000338***
(4.368)
-0.000231
(-1.583)
Yes
Yes

0.0103
(0.409)
0.737***
(10.86)
-5.26e-05
(-1.649)
0.00196
(1.291)
-0.00295
(-1.580)
-0.00111
(-0.660)
0.000388
(0.447)
-0.000740
(-1.438)
Yes
Yes

280
14
4775
0.0328
0.0717

280
14
1347
0.0609
0.106

The results from tables 3 to 6 tell us that there is no obvious pattern of strategic
interaction in expenditure categories to support yardstick competition. Except for health
and education under political affinity weighting scheme none of the other spatial lag
coefficients are statistically significant or even large enough to attract our attention. On
the other hand, the lagged dependent variable is always significant and has quite large
coefficient as well. We found similar result in table 2 as well. This again indicates the
strong time persistence of fiscal policy. The most important factor influencing a state’s
expenditure in any category is thus its past expenditure in the same category. Rural
development has a negative sign. This is unexpected by yardstick competition. We have
already found that at the aggregate level deficit of one state begets deficit of another. To
bolster yardstick competition as the counter explanation of this observed fact we need the
sign of spatial lag variables to be positive which would imply more expenditure in a
category by neighboring states begets more expenditure in the home state. However, the
evidence points to the existence of some spillover effect in rural development
expenditure. Rural laborers are most likely to travel to the geographically neighboring
states and thus create this spillover effect. However spillover effect reduces expenditure
and hence helps to better the deficit scenario. Thus aggregating spillover effect we cannot
get a counter explanation to the existence of SBC. Transport has both positive and
negative coefficients across different weighting schemes. Only the expenditures on
education and health are always positive. That means there might be some evidence that
states are influenced to mimic the expenditure pattern of neighbors (as defined by
different weighting schemes) in education and health. Following Case et al (1993) one
can take this to indicate that for these two categories the states seem to behave as if there
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is some yardstick competition going on. However, both the coefficients are only
statistically significant when we use political affinity weight. We have already seen that
due to the sparse nature of the political affinity weight matrix this is not a very good
weighting scheme. Moreover, as we already noted if yardstick competition is present then
that should manifest in other categories as well, and not just two. Coming to the Finance
Commission dummy and Affinity with Central government dummy variables, we again
find no clear pattern. Therefore, when we analyze individual expenditure categories, we
do not find any clear and unequivocal counter explanation in the theory of yardstick.
There is some weak evidence of yardstick competition in health and educational
expenditure only but nothing as conclusive as the evidence in support of SBC at the
aggregate level.

3.6. Conclusion
In this paper we started out to search for empirical evidence of soft budget
constraint in Indian state finances. Towards that end we modeled the fiscal deficits or
surpluses of states as functions of the fiscal deficits or surpluses of ‘neighboring’ states
using a spatially and temporally lagged dynamic model. We defined neighborhood using
geographic, economic and political factors. We hypothesized that if the states are found
to positively (negatively) respond to the surpluses (deficits) of neighboring states – that is
if the coefficient is positive after other factors that are likely to affect the surplus or
deficit are accounted for – then we can conclude that strategic interaction is present in
Indian state finance. Moreover, we also postulated that if such interaction is not resulting
from some underlying pattern of interaction in major expenditure categories, then that
would be symptomatic of the existence of soft budget constraint. Towards this second
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goal we modeled the expenditure in major expenditure categories using similar models as
those for the deficits/surpluses.
Throughout our sample period none of the states enjoyed a positive Gross Fiscal
balance. Thus the positive coefficient on the spatial lag variable in the deficit/surplus
equations mean that an increase in Gross Fiscal Deficit (as % of GDP) by neighbors
induces a state to increase its own Gross Fiscal Deficit (as % of GDP). There is also
evidence to support that states use deficits strategically to get more from the Fiscal
Commissions. Moreover, our models for the expenditure categories failed to offer any
clear pattern or even any consistently statistically significant pattern of interaction in the
major expenditure categories. In India, explicit bailouts by the central government
(Government of India) have not happened till date. Thus we can only indirectly observe
the states’ expectations of ‘implicit bailout’ by the effect of other states’ deficit behavior
on its own. In this interpretation the positive coefficient on the spatially lagged variable
tells us that states do not expect to be ‘punished’ in any way for incurring deficits when
their ‘neighbors’ also incur deficits. They expect their budget constraint to be soft and the
central government to come to their rescue using grants and transfers. Therefore, the
above results give evidence towards the existence of a soft budget constraint situation in
the state finances of India.
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Chapter 4: Essay 3 – Testing the Theory of Budgetary Punctuation
Using Indian State Budget Data

4.1. Introduction
Budget, as one of the relatively more obvious instruments and indicators of policy
focus of governments and the external manifestation of the choices among alternative
usages of scarce resources, can be expected to exhibit the same pattern of dynamics and
change as most other policy instruments. Incrementalism, which was developed by Davis
and colleagues during the 1960s and early 1970s, was the dominant explanation of the
public budgeting process for a considerable time period over the last century (Davis et al.,
1966a and 1966b; Davis, 1974). This theory of incrementalism tells us that the budget of
a year can be expected to be different from the previous year only by a small percentage
with exceptional changes being rare phenomena. However, this theory of budgetary
policy change came under serious scrutiny from almost the very beginning (Wanat, 1974;
Bailey and O’Connor, 1975; Dempster and Wildavsky, 1979; Berry 1990). Several
studies have found that budget data are characterized by a substantial number of dramatic
changes over previous years which cannot be explained by the incremental theory of
policy change (Natchez and Bupp, 1973; Danziger, 1978; Boyne et al. 2000). In 1993
Baumgartner and Jones introduced the theory of Punctuated Equilibrium, initially
developed in the field of Paleontology and Evolutionary Biology, to the study of policy
dynamics. The theory of Punctuated Equilibrium was offered as an extension,
improvement and replacement of the incrementalist theory.
Based on the concept of disproportionate information processing theory, bounded
rationality and agenda based policy making, the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
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describes policy processes as characterized by long periods of stability interrupted by
rapid and large changes. Bounded rationality of policy makers, oversupply of
information, and institutional frictions (Mortensen, 2005) are claimed to result in both
stability and punctuation in policy making. Researchers have applied this theory to study
budgetary changes along with other policy areas in several countries.
Till now, this theory has been applied and tested in quite a few western industrial
democracies with developed democratic political and policy making systems – both at
national and sub-national levels. Within these studies there is a preponderance of USA
based studies (Jones, Baumgartner, and True, 1998; Jordan, 2003; Robinson, 2004;
Breunig and Koski; 2006; Ryu, 2009). The other countries that have been analyzed are
UK (Breunig, 2006; John and Margetts, 2003), Denmark (Mortensen, 2005), France
(Baumgartner, Foucault and Francois, 2006) and Germany. In these studies the authors
have generally found the budgeting processes to follow the predictions of the Punctuated
Equilibrium Theory. However, there has been no attempt yet to test the applicability of
this theory of budgetary policy dynamics in the context of developing or transition
countries.
In this paper we extend this literature by testing the applicability of Punctuated
Equilibrium Theory to analyze the budget data of Indian states. We attempt to understand
whether the pattern predicted by this theory and observed in the context of the developed
industrialized countries above is also present in the behavior of budgets in a developing
country like India. On the one hand the political process in the states within the federal
system of India are much more central government dominated (through grants – both
conditional and unconditional, loans and insufficient revenue decentralization to the
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subnational levels) compared to the USA, while on the other hand, the process is more
federal in nature compared to the UK system from which it originated. The state policy
making process is also substantially different from the countries that has already been
studied – with political agenda being mainly dominated and directed by the political
parties, higher levels of illiteracy, lower political awareness among the electorate, lower
effects of grassroots politics and public opinion in the policy making process, and a
multiparty system which many times results in coalition governments. Whether such
differences affect the dynamics of policy is an important and interesting question that we
try to answer in this paper. Jones et al. (2009) have termed Punctuated Budgets as the
‘general law of budgeting’. However, in the context of India just observing stasis and
jumps in budgetary data may not be enough to support this ‘general law’. It has already
been commented that budgetary marksmanship in India suffers from forecast error
(Chakraborty and Sinha, 2008). Thus the observed pattern of stability and punctuations
may simply be due to error correction by the Finance Department from last year’s
estimates (difference between last year’s budget estimates and revised estimates) or last
to last year’s estimates (difference between last to last year’s budget estimates and
actuals) 26. To be able to conclusively accept the applicability of Punctuated Equilibrium
Theory, in this paper we also test the alternative explanation of forecast error correction.
The rest of this paper is organized in four more sections. Section II discusses the
theoretical background of the paper and the hypotheses. In section III, we elaborate on

26

The fiscal year in Indian states runs from April to March. The budget is generally presented in Indian
state legislatures by the Minister of Finance of the state government during end of February to middle of
March. The preparation of the budget by collecting the Demand for Grants from each Ministry or
Departments starts around September of the previous year and continues till February. At the time of
preparation of the Budget of any fiscal year, the Revised Estimate figures of the previous fiscal year and the
Actuals/Accounts figures of the year prior to the previous fiscal year are available for consideration.
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the data and method of my analysis; section IV discusses the results. The final section
concludes the paper.

4.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Decision making at the government level is characterized by disproportionate
information processing (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Disproportionate Information
Processing (DIP henceforth) is the general formulation of the punctuated equilibrium
model. The basic assumptions of both the incrementalist theory and DIP are the same.
Both assume bounded rationality and serial information processing among policy makers
and institutional friction in the processing capacity of political organizations (True, 1999,
p. 97). However, for incrementalism these factors result in stasis and stability, while
dramatic changes are relegated to the status of outliers. On the other hand, for DIP the
same basic factors give a scenario of stability interrupted with punctuations which are not
outliers but part of the system itself (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). Therefore,
incrementalism can be seen as a special case of DIP which focuses on periods of stability
alone.
Policy making process is divided into a general macro-political level and
specialized subsystems (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). The subsystems are characterized
by stasis in policy making and dampening of external shocks, while the macro-political
theatre is characterized by conflicts, heightened attention and positive feedback processes
which exacerbate and amplify shocks (Mortensen, 2005). Some policy issues regularly
hit the macro-political agenda without being redefined and without the mobilization of
new political actors. Some policy issues hit the macro-political agenda and disappear
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again without causing sustained and institutionalized changes in the policy. Finally some
policy issues never appear on the macro political agenda. The same serial decision
processing that ensure stability in normal periods also ensure increased focus on new
issues to the exclusion of others once the issue reaches the macropolitical stage (John and
Margetts, 2003).
The preceding discussion leads to the first hypothesis that I want to test using the
dataset of Indian state budgets.
Hypothesis 1: Indian state budgets are punctuated and follow the ‘general law of
budgets’ as espoused by Jones and colleagues.
According to Jones and Baumgartner (2005) the level of institutional friction,
information oversupply, availability of efficient information, interest mobilization
through interest groups and interest configurations are different across different
institutions and government organization. Thus the distributions of budgets changes
should be different depending on the spending category we are looking at (Ryu, 2009).
There are some spending categories where the beneficiaries are comparatively more
organized into different visible and politically important interest groups. In the Indian
context these are generally the employee and labor unions and employee coordination
committees (of mid to low level government employees both within the bureaucratic
mechanism and within the Public Sector Undertaking) which are affiliated to different
political parties. Since the beneficiaries of these spending categories are relatively more
organized, changes (especially downward) elicit much stronger and intense interest
mobilization. On the other hand there are spending categories where even though the
number of beneficiaries may be large but still they are neither organized nor politically
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visible. Thus these two types of spending categories should exhibit different levels of
punctuation. This leads to the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2: The extent of punctuations in India’s State Budgets varies across
spending categories.
Hypothesis 3: Spending categories where the beneficiaries are more organized and
visible suffer less from budgetary punctuations.
Finally, it is an important question to consider whether punctuated equilibrium
theory is a valid explanation to the budgetary punctuation which we may observe in the
data. There may be two objections in this regard. The first objection is whether it is
appropriate to use subnational data for a country like India to test a theory like punctuated
equilibrium. At least till 1991, Indian state finances were dominated by national planning
objectives coming down from the central governments. 27 Thus the remnants of such a
centrally driven system may still be in place reducing the policy autonomy of the states.
However, we contend that the liberalization policy pursued post-1991 has reduced the
importance of the centrally planned economic system in India and has created an
environment where the policy autonomy of the states has been introduced. Moreover, this
is also the same period when coalition governments became the rule at the central level
and resulted in weaker central governments vis-à-vis the states. The second objection is
that the observed budgetary punctuations may simply be corrections of forecast errors
made by finance departments in previous year’s budget. When the revised estimates (or
accounts/actuals) for a year diverges too much (by percentage) from what had been
27

In 1991 India faced a macroeconomic problem in the form of low forex reserves and declining value of
Indian currency. Indian central government had to take external loans and liberalize the economy partly as
condition of those loans.
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budgeted earlier, we say that there was a large forecast error in the budgeted amount.
This divergence may be a result of changing economic conditions which makes prior
budget calculations invalid or may be results of political exigencies during the execution
of the budget. If the budgetary punctuations are simply results of forecast errors
committed earlier, then we get an explanation for the punctuations that compete with the
punctuated equilibrium theory. This leads to the final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: The observed punctuated pattern of budgetary change can be
attributed to forecasting error of the finance departments.
In the next section we elaborate on the data and method I have used to test these
hypotheses.

4.3. Data and Methods
To study the extent of incrementalist vis-a-vis punctuated aspects of the budgets we
have constructed a new dataset of Budget Estimates and Revised Estimates of revenue
expenditures on twelve major categories of state functions across eighteen non-special
category states. These are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattishgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana,
Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Odhisha, Punjab,
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and West Bengal. Indian budgets
used to make a distinction between planned and non-planned expenditure till 2013. The
budgeted expenditure on any new project is kept under the "plan" portion of the budget if
the project was started within the current five year plan 28. Projects that started in a
previous five year plan, but still continuing is entered into the "non-plan" section. Any

28

It was not necessary that the project was a new project or scheme that started under the proposed budget
of the current year.
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government expenditure not started as part of the five year plans goes straight to the nonplan section from the beginning. This is an artificial distinction between expenditures
(unlike the distinction between revenue and capital expenditures) and recently the
Government of India has proposed scrapping this system of accounting (along with the
dilution of the entire system of five year plans). We, therefore, use the total budgeted
revenue expenditure figures (plan plus non-plan) instead of considering this distinction.
The twelve categories of expenditure considered are – education, health, water supply,
urban development, rural development, labor related expenditures, social security,
irrigation, roads and bridges, administration and police. These twelve categories are the
major expenditure categories devolved to the states under the federal system of the Indian
Constitution. The dataset covers the period from 2000 to 2013. The source of the data is
Reserve Bank of India's 29 yearly Study of State Finances. The nominal figures are
adjusted for inflation using Consumer Price Index (base year 2000) figures available from
the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database.
Time series data generally tends to exhibit nonstationarity and autoregression. Thus
instead of analyzing the annual figures of Budget Estimates, we examine the annual
percentage change of Budget Estimates. Thus, for each time period t, for the ith category
of expenditure we compute (Xit–Xit-1)/Xit-1 and multiply it by 100 to express these as
percentages. This percentage-count measure is the usual measure constructed by other
studies of budgetary punctuation (for example Jones, Sulkin and Larsen 2003) 30. These
annual change scores are pooled by state and then by categories (separately) to give the
29

The central bank of India.
The other measure that could be constructed is the percentage-percentage measure. This measures is
defined as the percentage change in relative importance of the ith category from time t-1 to t, or
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datasets that we use for the analysis. Three states (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya
Pradesh) were split in 2000-01 and thus three extra states were created from them
(namely, Jharkhand, Uttaranchal/Uttarakhand, and Chhattishgarh). The 2001-02 figures
for these states therefore show abnormal annual changes which are clearly not due to
budgetary punctuation. Therefore we dropped these years for these states from the
analysis. For all other states the change scores start from 2001.
The methods we use for the analysis are threefold. First we "eyeball" the
distributions using the histograms for each category (pooled across all states by years)
and for states (pooled across all categories by years) along with a normal distribution
probability density function curve of the same mean and same variance. Distributions of
variables that show punctuation are characterized by high peaks (overrepresentation of
small changes), weak shoulder (underrepresentation of midrange changes) and fat tails
(some massive changes) (see for example Breunig et. al. 2009) compared to normal
distributions. In other words these distributions exhibit leptokurtic nature. The choice of
bins (groupings of percentage changes) and hence smoothing is an important
consideration while constructing histograms. Several methods are available from the
statistics literature to construct optimal bin width and hence bin numbers (Izenman,
1991). Some of these methods implicitly assume a Gaussian distribution of the
underlying data generating process and hence are not appropriate for my analysis. We use
the Freedman-Diaconis rule of optimal bin width, h = 2*IQR*N(-1/3). IQR in this formula
is the interquartile range of the data (75th percentile minus the 25th percentile) and N is
the sample size.
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The second method involves directly testing for normality. Within this second
method, there are again two choices available - visual and statistical testing. The visual
method involves creating Q-Q plots for the data series. If the observed data deviates from
the diagonal line too much then we can suspect a violation of normality. The testing
methods involve using explicit tests of normality like Kolmogorov-Smirnov, ShapiroWilk, Lilliefors or Anderson-Darling test (Razali and Wah, 2011). We use both methods
as using only the tests are not recommended (D'Agostino, Belanger, and D'Agostino,
1990). The extant literature uses both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests
(Breunig and Koski, 2006; Mortensen, 2005). The null hypothesis in both tests is that the
data follows normal distribution. But the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is considered to have
lower power than the Shapiro-Wilk test, especially when leptokurtosis is involved which
is the scenario with my data. Thus the statistics literature prefers the latter over the former
when the mean and variance are not known. The null hypothesis in the Shapiro-Wilk test
is that the data generating process is normal. If the null is true, the W statistic is equal to
one, while if W is significantly smaller than one, then we can reject the null of normality.
The Shapiro-Wilk test is also augmented with the Shapiro-Francia W' test.
For an initial inspection we pool the data for all the states and all categories in the
sample and create combined series of annual changes. This gives me 2732 observations
in total (after deleting missing values). Figure 4.1 shows the histogram of distribution
created for this combined series. The rug on top of this histogram shows the frequency of
each change score. The three figures, Fig 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 shows the distribution of the
percentage-count change scores for each of the states in my sample. The next set of
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figures, Fig. 4.5 and 4.6 shows the distribution of the dependent variable for each of the
twelve spending categories.
Next, we construct the Q-Normal plots for visually inspecting the deviation of the
annual percentage changes of budgeted expenditures in state (all categories combined)
and in each category (All states combined) separately. Given that our sample is
chronologically not very long we refrain from constructing the plots for each category for
each state separately. These figures are presented in the Appendix B as figures B.1 to
B.5. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 contain the descriptive statistics and the results of the formal
tests of normality. For non-Gaussian distribution mean and variance is not very
meaningful measures of descriptive statistics. Therefore, following the suggestions from
the applied statistics literature and the standard practices in the punctuated equilibrium
literature compute the Median, Interquartile Range, Kurtosis and L-Kurtosis. Standard
Kurtosis measures are overly affected by large outliers. Our data is characterized by large
outliers, hence we need some better measure of Kurtosis than the standard one.
Fortunately, such measures (robust of the presence of outliers) are available in the form
of L-Kurtosis measure (Hosking, 1990) and we present those numbers computed from the
data. The columns S-F and S-W in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 contain the value of the test
statistics from these two tests and the p-value columns contain the p-values for each
corresponding test statistic.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates,
combined 2001-2013

4.4. Results and Discussion
Results of our analysis using the methodology explained in the previous section
indicate a strong presence of budgetary punctuation in the budgets of the states of India.
In Fig.4.1, we present the distribution of the annual percentage changes of budgeted
expenditures in all categories for all states, for the entire sample period. The ‘rug’ above
the histogram indicates the frequency of each observed percentage change values
(measured along the horizontal axis). The continuous curve is indicative of a normal
distribution with same mean and standard deviation. A simple visual inspection of this
figure tells us that the distribution of changes in budgetary expenditure is not normal.
Similar distribution of the aggregate data has been observed for other countries as well
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(for example, Mortensen, 2005, p. 941 for Danish local budget; Breunig et. al. 2009, p. 9,
for USA). The distribution shows classic signs of leptokurtosis. If the budget changes
were normally distributed then we would see approximately around 68.26% of the
observations to fall within one standard deviation of the mean. In our sample, 89.72%
observations lie between plus and minus one standard deviation of the mean. On the other
hand for a normal distribution only 0.26% of the observations should lie outside the range
of plus and minus three standard deviations from the mean. However, in our sample
around 1.79% of the observations lie outside this boundary. As a result there are
relatively far less observations in the range of one standard deviation to three standard
deviation. Breunig et. al. (2009) defines any change greater than 50% as “massive
increases”. In the present sample, 8.24% of the observations satisfy this criterion. Thus at
a combined level the state budgetary changes in India shows severe leptokurtic behavior.
In other words the budgeted expenditure changes at the state level in India are
characterized by stability which is frequently interrupted by very large punctuations.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates (by
State, 2001-2013)

Figure 4.3: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates (by
State, 2001-2013)
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates (by
State, 2001-2013)

Figure 4.5: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates (by
Category, 2001-2013)
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This aggregate picture may mask a lot of state to state and category specific
variation in the pattern of the distribution of annual change. As the next level of
exploration, we therefore, have plotted the distributions of the annual changes in
budgeted expenditures for each state (all categories combined) and for each category (for
all states combined). Figure 4.2 to 4.6 present these distributions.

Figure 4.6: Distribution of Annual Percentage Changes of Budget Estimates (by
Category, 2001-2013)

Figures 4.2 to 4.3 show that the punctuated nature of budgetary changes is not
specific to any particular state of India. Some states (Goa, Odhisha, and West Bengal)
may not have seen any reduction greater than 50 percent, but all states experience
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increases greater than 50 percent quite frequently. Moreover, figures 4.5 and 4.6 show
that almost all categories of expenditure exhibit characteristics of leptokurtic distribution.
Thus the punctuated pattern of annual change is neither driven by any particular state nor
by any particular category. However, as we will soon discuss there is considerable
variability in the extent of punctuation for different categories of expenditures.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Normality Results of Budget Changes in Each State,
2001-2013
Kurtosi
L-Kurtosis
S-F
p value S-W
p value
State
Median
IQR
s
Andhra Pradesh
Bihar
Chhattishgarh
Goa
Gujarat
Haryana
Jharkhand
Karnataka
Kerala
Maharashtra
Madhya Pradesh
Odhisha
Punjab
Rajasthan

4.667
5.332
8.277
6.987
3.739
4.880
4.059
5.887
4.567
4.120
6.045
5.946
0.343
2.220

19.433
22.972
24.365
18.212
19.009
17.461
31.852
21.548
20.855
19.546
15.449
25.186
19.419
19.502

33.805
42.879
47.607
12.788
11.606
19.278
24.863
11.584
8.874
18.307
22.464
12.353
17.315
25.966

0.313
0.411
0.367
0.390
0.328
0.359
0.366
0.307
0.328
0.524
0.394
0.309
0.492
0.379

0.699
0.546
0.528
0.677
0.830
0.692
0.672
0.837
0.874
0.529
0.668
0.780
0.604
0.674

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.714
0.561
0.542
0.684
0.842
0.703
0.686
0.846
0.885
0.537
0.680
0.788
0.612
0.690

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
Uttarakhand
West Bengal
Total

4.775
2.093
4.211
2.752
4.470

17.689
19.601
21.193
15.209
19.92

39.609
32.283
51.163
24.423
44.035

0.403
0.497
0.474
0.342
0.407

0.626
0.503
0.498
0.761
0.605

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.641
0.517
0.513
0.775
0.606

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

S-F: Shapiro-Francia, S-W: Shapiro-Wilk, IQR: Inter Quartile Range

To bolster these conclusions reached by a simple visual inspection of the data we
have provided the relevant numerical measures that characterize the distributions and the
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results of the formal tests of normality in tables 4.1 and 4.2. Once we leave the realm of
Gaussian or Normal distribution the popular measures – mean and standard deviation –
lose much of their sheen. Therefore, following the extant literature we have provided two
other measures of central tendency and dispersion – the median and the interquartile
range. Moreover, since the regular Kurtosis measure is not well behaved in the presence
of outliers (which is the case with our sample), we have computed the L-kurtosis for the
annual percentage changes – for each state (all categories combined) and for each
category (all states combined). As can be seen from table 1, the overall distribution of
budget changes in each state is characterized by leptokurtosis – L-Kurtosis values far
higher than 0.12 which corresponds to a Normal distribution. However, the leptokurtosis
is far less strong in categories of expenditure like Education, Health, and Police than in
categories like Labor, Irrigation and Rural Development. This is even more starkly
presented in Figure 4. The last four columns of table 4.1 and 4.2 present the results of the
tests of Normality. As we can see from the associated p-values of each test, the null
hypothesis of normal distribution can be easily rejected in each of them. Statistics
literature argues that one should not only depend on the numerical tests for testing
normality of any data series. Following this suggestion, we have created the Q-plots for
each state and for each category (all states combined). These are presented in Appendix
B. Combining these results and diagrams I can conclude that the budgetary changes in
each state and in each category exhibits punctuations.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics and Tests of Normality Results of Budget Changes in Each
Expenditure Category, 2001-2013
Expenditure
Lp
p
Categories
Median
IQR
Kurtosis Kurtosis
S-F
value
S-W
value
Labor
2.167
20.959
23.571
0.414
0.622
Irrigation
1.937
15.238
23.743
0.408
0.652
Rural
Development
6.369
28.248
21.870
0.382
0.681
Urban
Development
8.231
43.911
14.928
0.369
0.667
Roads
2.532
33.137
13.445
0.346
0.749
Water
1.752
23.613
17.952
0.345
0.788
Social Security 10.070
25.506
19.203
0.329
0.691
Administration
4.211
19.186
8.522
0.254
0.906
Agriculture
5.536
23.414
9.125
0.244
0.897
Health
3.900
12.327
31.381
0.230
0.765
Police
4.978
11.533
8.070
0.225
0.894
Education
4.674
13.546
4.344
0.193
0.949
S-F: Shapiro-Francia, S-W: Shapiro-Wilk, IQR: Inter Quartile Range
(Ordered according to L-Kurtosis Value)

0.000
0.000

0.631
0.661

0.000
0.000

0.000

0.689

0.000

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.671
0.755
0.798
0.699
0.912
0.906
0.776
0.900
0.951

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Figure 4.7: L-Kurtosis for All Expenditure Categories,
All States combined, 2001-2013
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Both table 4.2 and Fig. 4.7 show (and also the Fig. 4.5, and 4.6) that certain
categories of expenditure exhibit more leptokurtic nature or punctuated nature than other
categories. Education, Police, Health, Agriculture, and Administration shows lower
values of L-Kurtosis compared to Labor, Irrigation, Rural Development and Urban
Development. The top five categories in Fig. 4.7 constitute areas where the wage and
salary component is very high. The employees in schools and colleges, police, hospitals
and health centers, and government administration are organized into strong labor and
employee unions. Expenditure on the category ‘Agriculture’ creates a strong vested
interest group in rural sector which are crucial for electoral fortunes. On the other hand
spending categories like Labor, Irrigation, Rural and Urban Development, although may
be economically very important, but does not create well defined beneficiary groups.
Most of these tasks are undertaken by private contractors under government tender which
means the workers do not constitute strong labor unions either. However, due to changing
natural fortunes of Monsoon (annual rainy season in India) flood and draught issues make
spending categories like Irrigation hit the macro-political agenda at regular intervals
which results in more punctuations in this type of categories. According to Baumgartner
and Jones, such interest configurations results in more stasis in the former group of
categories, while relatively more punctuations in the latter.
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4.5. Are There Competing Explanations
Thus far we have shown that even being a developing country, far away from the
sample of countries – both socially and economically – that has generally been subjected
to punctuated equilibrium studies till now, Indian state budgets conform to the pattern
exhibited and explained by Punctuated Equilibrium Theory. However, it is not necessary
that large annual changes be indicative of bounded rationality and disproportionate
information processing by the political system of the type that underlines the Punctuated
Equilibrium Theory. Such large changes may simply be reactions of the budget officers
(Finance Department Officials) to previous year’s wrong forecasts. It might simply be the
case that if for any category the gap between Revised Estimates and Budget Estimates of
the immediately preceding year is large and positive (realized expenditure greater than
what budgeted) then the officials allocate a larger sum for that category compared to last
year’s budget. Since Revised Estimates are results of ex post economic condition of the
economy therefore, in this scenario budgetary punctuations can actually be explained by
the economic condition of the previous year, rather than disproportionate information
processing of the officials and policy makers.
Large punctuated changes may also be the result of political exigencies like state
legislative elections. Sitting governments have clear objective of being reelected. The
most prominent ways it can capture the imagination of the state citizens is by spending
more during elections years (and may be one year prior to the election year). Thus the
large changes in budgeted expenditure may be because of election years.
Just as sitting governments have interest of being reelected and thus may be found
to spend more during election years, similarly, the opposition parties also make populist
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promises of higher spending in several sectors during the political campaign. Thus if the
opposition comes to power in a state election, the year following the state election may
see large increases in budgeted expenditures. If the years around the state election years
see large changes in budgetary allocations, then such changes are better explained by the
political needs of the parties rather than bounded rationality of the budgetary decision
makers.
Finally, large changes in Revenue Expenditure may be the result of large Capital
Expenditures in the same sectors in a prior year. Additional capital expenditure in a
previous year creates new employment and other avenues of expenditures which the
Revenue Expenditure of subsequent years must account for. In such cases, the observed
punctuated changes in the Revenue Expenditure would be the explained by the Capital
Expenditure.
To test the importance of these counter explanations I estimate the following
model.
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Where the dependent variable is the change in budgetary expenditure for state i in year t.
The first explanatory variable election is a dummy variable. We have tested two different
versions of this variable. In the first version this variable is one for election years, and
zero for every other year. In the second version this variable is one for the election years,
the year preceding the election year and the year following the election year. Gap is the
revised expenditure and budgeted expenditure gap of the previous year. The variable
cap_score is the annual percentage change in capital expenditure in the same sector in the
previous year. Not all capital expenditure figures were available and due to this data
103

limitation we have estimated the above model for Education, Health, Water Supply,
Urban and Rural Development, General Government Administration and Irrigation. Once
the models are estimated, we compute the residuals. If the residuals still exhibit
leptokurtic distribution then we can conclude that these counter explanations are not
valid. The models are estimated as fixed effect models. The results are presented in table
4.3 and 4.4.
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Table 4.3: Fixed Effect Estimation Results
Dependent
Variable

Election Year
Dummy

Education

Education

Health

Health

Urban Dev.

Urban Dev.

Water Supply

Water Supply

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

4.308

3.773

13.156

-5.845

(1.689)**

(1.601)***

(20.258)

(11.657)

Election Year
and one year
on either side
dummy

Change in
Capital
Expenditure in
previous year

Revised
EstimatesBudget
Estimates Gap
Overall R2

-1.252

0.779

35.297

7.611

(1.5)

(1.369)

(17.080)**

(9.697)

-0.002

-0.002

0.005

0.005

0.0003

0.0003

-0.0005

-0.0008

(.003)

(.003)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.0001)**

(0.0001)**

(0.003)

(0.003)

.790

.796

0.791

0.781

0.478

0.466

1.316

1.321

(.089)***

(.094)***

(0.855)***

(0.087)***

(0.142)**

(0.142)**

(0.22)***

(0.219)***

.28

.25

.29

.27

.11

0.12

0.17

0.17

Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 4.4: Fixed Effect Estimation Results (Cont.)
Dependent
Variable

Election Year
Dummy

Rural Dev.

Rural Dev.

Government
Administration

Government
Administration

Irrigation

Irrigation

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

13.654

2.507

0.341

(8.281)

(3.285)

(3.055)

Election Year and
one year on either
side

Change in Capital
Expenditure in
previous year

9.48

-0.602

-1.428

(6.767)

(2.759)

(2.637)

-0.004

-0.003

-0.004

-0.004

0.008

0.015

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.032)

(0.033)

Revised EstimatesBudget Estimates
Gap

1.117

1.167

1.145

1.135

0.987

.999

(0.145)***

(0.143)***

(0.12)***

(0.121)***

(0.108)***

(0.11)***

Overall R2

0.24

0.24

0.25

0.24

0.32

0.31

Standard errors in parenthesis.
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The estimated models explain varied amounts of the total variation in the annual
percentage change in budgetary expenditures. The variation is quite dramatic across
different spending categories. On the one hand we have Education, Health and Irrigation
where twenty five percent or more of the total overall variation is explained by the model.
On the other we have Urban Development where this percentage comes down to around
eleven. Although we have presented the standard errors in the parenthesis, but unless the
residuals are proved to be normally distributed the tests of significance are meaningless.
The gap between revised and budget estimates in the previous year seems to explain a
large part of the explained variation. For every one percent increase in the gap, budgetary
expenditure in the current year seem to increase by around 79 percentage points for
Education and Health, 48 percentage points for Urban Development, and by more than
100 percentage points for Water Supply and Rural Development. Thus, forecast error in
previous year seems to affect the budgetary changes to a large extent. It appears that in
the sample, other than water supply, all types of expenditure increases in the election
years. However, there is not much evidence to support the hypothesis that expenditure
changes that much in the year preceding and following the state election.
The gap between the revised and budget estimates in the previous year seem to
explain a substantial part of the explained variation in the annual budgetary change.
However, what is more important is the distribution of the residuals once this effect is
taken care off. In table 4.5 we present the L-kurtosis value of the residuals along with the
Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests of normality. The L-kurtosis values are still much
higher than 0.12 which is the L-Kurtosis value of the normal distribution. Both the
Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francia tests reject the null hypothesis of normality of the
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residuals at least at five percent level of significance for each type of expenditure. Thus
the residuals still exhibit leptokurtic distributions.

Table 4.5: Test of Normality Results for the Estimated Residuals
Residual of
Model
L-Kurtosis
S-F
p-value
S-W
Education
Health
Urban Development
Water Supply
Rural Development
Administration
Irrigation

Model 1
Model 2
Model 1
Model 2
Model 1
Model 2
Model 1
Model 2
Model 1
Model 2
Model 1
Model 2
Model 1
Model 2

0.232
0.199
0.164
0.166
0.447
0.411
0.398
0.406
0.345
0.335
0.225
0.221
0.298
0.293

0.8667
0.88358
0.98104
0.97339
0.61023
0.62433
0.45231
0.45246
0.74425
0.73352
0.91419
0.91978
0.77749
0.7916

0
0
0.01118
0.00106
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.85625
0.87259
0.98101
0.97296
0.59568
0.61045
0.43546
0.4355
0.73119
0.72014
0.90735
0.91314
0.76341
0.77830

p-value
0.00001
0.00001
0.01268
0.00147
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001
0.00001

4.6. Conclusion
In this paper we set out to test the applicability of the Punctuated Equilibrium
Theory of budgetary change using data from Indian state budgets. The results presented
in this paper demonstrate that the annual budget changes in Indian States exhibit both
stasis and punctuations. The distribution of these changes can easily be seen to be more
leptokurtic than the Gaussian distribution. These findings are observed across states and
across spending categories. The degree of punctuation (or leptokurtosis) is larger in
spending categories where the beneficiaries are not well defined or formally organized in
politically important interest groups. We also tested some alternative explanations to the
108

observed punctuated pattern of budgetary changes in the Indian state budgets. We found
that forecast error correction explain a part of this pattern. However, even after
accounting for the forecast error correction, we are still left with large residual leptokurtic
variation in annual change in the budget. Thus the primary findings in this paper extend
the existing literature on budgetary punctuation developed for countries like USA, UK,
Germany, Denmark and France to India. Therefore, it seems that punctuated equilibrium
theory can describe the behavior of budgetary policy even in developing parliamentary
democracies like India.
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Appendix A: Definitions and Source of Variables for Tax Interaction
Analysis
Variable

Definition

Source

EATR

Effective Average Tax Rate.
Computed following the
definition of Devereux and
Griffith (1998).

Computed from tax rate data
collected from AEI tax
database. Other required
variables in the computation
were collected from World
Bank Open Database.

STR

Top statutory tax rate.

AEI tax database for tax rates.

Dependency Ratio Ratio of young (less than 14
years) and old (older than 65
years) people to working age (1464 years) population.

World Bank Open Database
and World Bank Development
Indicator Database.

Population
Density

Population per sq. KM.

World Bank Open Database
and World Bank Development
Indicator Database.

Government
Expenditure

Government final consumption
expenditure.

World Bank Open Database
and World Bank Development
Indicator Database.

Openness

Total of export and import as a
percentage of GDP.

World Bank Open Database
and World Bank Development
Indicator Database.

Per capita
GDP

real Real GDP (in 2005 US$) divided
by total population

Urban Population

Proportion of population living in
urban areas.

Rent from Natural Rent from Natural Resources as
Resources
percentage of GDP.
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World Bank Open Database
and World Bank Development
Indicator Database.
World Bank Open Database
and World Bank Development
Indicator Database.
World Bank Open Database
and World Bank Development
Indicator Database.

Appendix B: Q-Normal Plots of Annual Changes in Budget Estimates

Figure B.1: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in budget Estimates (By State, 2001-2013)
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Figure B.2: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in budget Estimates (By State, 2001-2013)
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Figure B3: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in budget Estimates (By State, 2001-2013)

120

Figure B.4: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in Budget Estimates (By Category, 20012013)
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Figure B.5: Q-Normal Plot of Annual Change in Budget Estimates (By Category, 20012013)
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